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THE BATTLE OF EXEMPTIONS
ALBERT COATES*

In the year 1665, the Lords Proprietors authorized "equall taxes
and assessments eqyally to rayse Moneyes or goods upon all Lands
(excepting the lands of us the Lords Propryators before setling) or
persons within the severall precincts Hundreds Parishes Manors or
whatsoever other denizons shall hereafter be made and established in
ye said Countyes as oft as necessity shall require and in such manner
as to them shall seems most equall and easye for ye said Inhabitants
in order to the better supporting of the publick Charge of the said Government, and for the mutuaall safety defense and security of ye
Countyes."'
In 1868 the North Carolina Constitutional Convention provided that
"Laws shall be passed, taxing by a uniform rule all moneys, credits,
investments in bonds, stocks, joint-stock companies, or otherwise; and,
also, all real and personal property, according to its true value in money.
The general assembly may also tax trades, professions, franchises, and
incomes: Provided, that no income shall be taxed when the property
from which the income is derived is taxed." 2
The 1868 convention also provided that "Property belonging to the
State, or to municipal corporations, shall be exempt from taxation. The
general assembly may exempt cei.eteries, and property held for educational, scientific, literary, charitable, or religious purposes; also, wearing
apparel, arms for muster, household and kitchen furniture, the mechanical and agricultural implements of mechanics and farmers, libraries, and
scientific instruments, to a value not exceeding three hundred dollars."
The constitutional basis of property tax exemptions has many times
been broadened: in 1876 a constitutional amendment permitted the
general assembly to exempt "any other personal property" up to $300
in value, in addition to the specific items enumerated ;4 an amendment
in 1918 required the general assembly to exempt "from taxes of every
kind" notes, mortgages, and all other evidence of indebtedness, made
to run for not less than five nor more than twenty years, given in good
faith for the purchase price of a home, when the purchase price does

not exceed three thousand dollars, and the interest rate does not exceed
five and one-half per cent;5 an amendment in 1924 extended the 1918
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mandatory exemption to fifty per cent of an eight thousand dollar value,
and further broadened this exemption at some points and narrowed it
at others ;6 an amendment in 1936 removed the requirement that the
general assembly must exempt this particularproperty and substituted
the provision that the general assembly may classify all types of property
for taxation purposes, so long as the taxes are uniform within each
7
class.
Thus the problem of who and what to tax, or exempt from tax, so
baldly stated in the 1665 authorization to tax "all lands, excepting the
lands of us the Lords Propryators", has continued throughout the two
hundred and seventy-five years from that day to this. For the past
few years the problem has been, and perhaps still is, acute with reference to "property belonging to the state or to municipal corporations";
it is at fever heat today with reference to income producing property
held by charitable organizations. This article undertakes to inquire into
the background, development, and present status of these property tax
exemptions, in the effort to throw light on existing controversies. It
outlines (1) the property taxed, (2) the taxing methods as affecting
the twin problems of taxation and exemptions, and (3) the property
exempt from taxes.
II
PROPERTY TAxES

When the 1868 convention wrote into the constitution of North
Carolina the requirement that "Laws shall be passed, taxing by a
uniform rule all moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, jointstock companies, or otherwise; and, also, all real and personal property,
according to its true value in money," it gave expression to a policy
which had been evolving out of the experience of Proprietors, King,
and People for nearly two hundred years-from days when taxation
was the exception and exemption was the rule, to days when taxation
was the rule, and exemption the exception.
Lands. Throughout colonial days the Lords Proprietors (16631729), followed by the Crown (1729-1776), collected "quit rents" at
varying rates per acre of land,9 to cover the small costs of government.
The laws of 1715 imposed "a tax upon land" ;1o and as lands were
developed throughout the years this tax expanded to include all "houses"
thereon,"1 all "buildings and structures thereon", 12 all "improvements
and permanent fixtures" thereon,'" and all "rights and privileges belong8 N. C. CoNsT. (1924) art. V, §3.
N. C. Co r. (1936) art. V, §3.
IN. C. CoNsT. (1868) art. V, §3.
"MAcoN, A FiscAl HIsTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA (1932) 87.
N.
C.
PUB.
LAWS
1715,
c.
63,
§1.
11 N. C. PUm. LAws 1777, c. 2, §2.
12 N. C. PUB. LAws 1782, c. 7, §1.
'IN. C. PuB. LAWS 1939, c. 310, §2(30).
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ing or in anywise appertaining thereto". 4 Thus, the tax on land has
expanded-to include a tax on things affixed to land, and both land and
things affixed to land are steadily expanding in volume and in value as
new discoveries bring new uses: as the discovery of electricity turns
flowing streams into potential sources of electric power, and is followed
by power dams, lakes and reservoirs, transmission lines from power
plants to market places and the machinery for transmuting a river of
water into light; as the invention of motor vehicles gives new values
to oil lands, turns appropriate locations into potential sites for manufacturing plants, garages and service stations; and so on in multiplying
illustrations.
PersonalProperty: Tangible. The tax on tangible personal property
started with a tax on a few specifically enumerated items and spread to
others: in 1777 it was a tax on "slaves, stock in trade, horses and.
cattle";15 in 1851 it was a tax on gold and silver plate, ornamental
jewelry, pleasure vehicles, gold and silver watches, harps and piano
fortes used by the owner, pistols, bowie knives, dirks and sword canes;'(
the laws of 1863 added household and kitchen furniture, horses, mules,
cattle, hogs and other livestock kept for sale, cotton and tobacco, with
scattered exemptions of specific items ;17 the laws of 1867 added wagons
and other farming utensils, agricultural products, ships, barges, boats
and other watercraft, with scattered exemptions;18 the laws of 1869
taxed "all personal property". 9 Thus the transition was complete from
the days when all personal property was exempt unless specifically taxed
to the day when all was taxed unless specifically exempted.
Intangible. The tax on intangible personal property also began with
a few specifically enumerated items, and spread to others: in 1777 it
was a tax on "money and interest" ;20 in 1851 it was a tax on interest
due from solvent debtors, on money invested in slave trade, in stocks
of any kind, in shares in any trading company, mortgages and deeds of
trust ;21 the laws of 1867 expanded solvent credits to include all claims
or demands owned by the taxpayer whether due or not, and added investments in public "bonds, shares of stocks in National Banks located
in this state, and money invested in any trade or business ;22 the laws
of 1869 taxed "all moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, jointstock companies or otherwise".2 3 Again the transition was complete
Ibid.
' N. C. PuB. LAWS 1777, c. 2, §2.
"" N.
C.
PuB. LAws 1850-51, c. 121, §§2, 5.
N. C. PuB. LAWS 1862-63, c. 57, §1.
N. C. Ptm.LAws 1866-67, c. 72, Schedule A.
'N. C. PUm. LAWS 1868-69, c. 108, Class 1.
oN.C. PuR. LAWS 1777, c. 2, §2.
21 N. C. PuB. LAWS 1850-51, c. 121, §§1, 2.
21 N. C. PuB. LAWS 1866-67, c. 72, Schedule A.
21N. C. PuR. LAws 1868-69, c. 108, Class 1.
2,
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from the days when all intangible property was exempt unless specifically taxed to the day when all was taxed unless specifically exempted.
Thus, the tax on personal property has expanded from a tax on
tangibles to a tax on intangibles also, and the volume and value of both
tangibles and intangibles steadily increases as new discoveries bring new
uses: as the telegraph, telephone, and radio, along with electric power
and motor power and other sources of property flowing from inventive
genius bring into existence new types of personal property unknown
before.
III
TAXING METHODS AS RELATED TO EXEMPTIONS
A. "TAXING BY A UNIFORM RULE"

Land. There is evidence that land was sometimes classified in
colonial days for the payment of quit rents to the King. A report in
1773 shows payments on one class of lands at the rate of twelve pence
per hundred acres, another class at the rate of six pence, and another
at the rate of four pence. 24 In 1784 a legislative committee proposed
that land be divided for taxation into three classes according td fertility
but this proposal was defeated. 25 Two years later a different form of
classification was proposed and enacted: land east of the Blue Ridge
Mountains was taxed at one rate; land between the Blue Ridge and
Cumberlandi Mountains at two-thirds of this rate; land lying beyond
the Cumberland Mountains at one-third.26 The desire to attract and
hold settlers beyond the mountains succeeded where the desire to
equalize land taxes at home had failed.
The legislative refusal during the next three quarters of a century
to exercise its freedom to classify lands crystallized in the constitutional
27
requirement of 1868 that all property be taxed by a uniform rule.
This uniform rule prevented classification, in theory at least, for another three quarters of a century until the 1936 amendment to the constitution restored the legislative power to classify lands for taxes so
28
long as the taxes were uniform within each class.
Pursuant to the 1936 amendment, the legislature began to exercise
its newly restored freedom to classify by declaring it to be the "policy
of this state so to use its system of real estate taxation as to encourage
the conservation of natural resources and the beautification of homes
and roadsides, and all tax assessors are hereby instructed to make no
increase in the tax valuation of real estate as a result of the owner's
enterprise in adopting any one or more of the following progressive
2'9 SAUNDERS, COLONIAL RECORDS o NORTH CAROLINA 368.
-1119 CLARK, STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 598.
2"24 CLARK, STATE REcoRDs OF NORTH CAROLINA 952.
17N. C. CONST. (1868) art. V, §3.
11 N. C. Coxsr. (1936) art. V, §3.
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policies: (1) Planting and care of lawns, shade trees, shrubs and flowers for non-commercial purposes, (2) Repainting buildings, (3) Terracing or other methods of soil conservation, to the extent that they
preserve values already existing, (4) Protection of forests against fire,
(5) Planting of forest trees on vacant land for reforestation purposes
(for ten years after such planting) ."29 But throughout the period
from 1868 to 1936 neither constitutional mandate nor legislative fiat
completely prevented listtakers and assessors from exercising a discretionary power denied them by the law and substituting an extra legal
classification according to their own individual conceptions of social
policy; and the 1936 amendment simply allowed all listtakers and
assessors to do legally what many had long been doing without
authority.
Personal Property. From the beginnings of law making in North
Carolina the legislature exercised its freedom to classify personal property for tax purposes: by taxing some classes of personal property and
not taxing others ;3o by taxing different classes at different rates ;3aby
taxing different items at different rates ;32 by classifying and re-classifying tangible and intangible personal property at will. 33 In theory the
legislature lost the power to classify tangible or intangible personal
property when the 1868 constitution prescribed that all property be
taxed by a uniform rule. And, in practice, it adhered to uniformity
except in the instance of certain forms of intangible property.8 4 The
1936 amendment to the constitution restored the legislative power to
classify personal property for taxation. 35 Open classification of intangibles reappeared, as the general assembly in 1937 levied a tax of ten
cents on the hundred dollars value of bank deposits; twenty cents on
the hundred dollars of money in hand; twenty-five cents on accounts
receivable, and certain matured insurance, annuities and trust funds;
thirty cents on corporate stocks; forty cents on bonds, notes, mortgages
36
and other evidences of debt.
As between real and personal property the legislature continually
used its classifying power. At one time it fixed the tax on intangibles
at one rate and the tax on land and tangibles at another.37 Later it re20
N. C. PuB. LAWS 1939, c. 310, §500.
Co N. C. PuB. LAWS 1777, c. 2, §2.
2'IN. C. REv. STAT. (1836-37) c. 102; N. C. REv. CODE (1854) c. 99.
"Ibid.
N. C. PuB. LAws 1777, c. 2, §2; N. C. Pun. LAws 1782, c. 7, §1; N. C. Pun.
LAWS 1784, c. 1,§1.
" N. C. PuB. LAWS 1868-69, c. 74, §13(6), provided that "stocks in any incorporated company . .. and their estimated value" shall be listed for taxation, "but
the stock shall not be taxed if the property of the company pays a tax". N. C.
PuB. LAws 1868-69, c. 74, §12, taxed solvent credits but allowed the taxpayer to
deduct from the value of such credits the amount owed by him.
"CN. C. CoNsr. (1936) art. V, §3.
C N. C. Pun. LAWS 1937, c. 127, Schedule H.
"7N. C. PuB. LAws 1781, c. 3, §2.
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moved the tax on intangibles altogether and continued the tax on lands
and tangibles.3 8 Again it removed the tax on tangible personal property
and continued the tax on lands.39 This power to classify property into
real and personal was lost in the constitution of 1868,40 and restored
41

in 1936.

Thus, after an intermission of sixty-eight years, the general assembly
is again as free as it was from 1663 to 1868 to classify for taxation
purposes all property whether real or personal and whether tangible or
intangible.
B. "ACCORDING TO ITS TRUE VALUE IN

MONEY"

Throughout Colonial days and, with a short intermission through
the Revolution, up into the second decade of the nineteenth century,
land was taxed by quantity and not by value. 42 The owners of nature's
favored acres were North Carolina's favored sons. As early as 1756
the town of Wilmington abandoned the quantity theory and levied a tax
of two cents on the $100 value of every house in town. 4'In 1778, under the stress and strain of war the general assembly
in a memorable enactment levied its property taxes on specific items
according to value: "Whereas it is necessary . . .that the Treasury be
as soon as possible supplied with money . . . and nothing can answer

such purposes so effectually, and with such convenience and advantage
to this state, as a general tax in proportion to the ability of each individual citizen throughout the sanw. . . ."44 (Italics ours.) When the
war was over this limited tax levied according to value was discarded
for an acreage tax reminiscent of Colonial days. The ad valorem land
5
tax did not return to stay until 1814.4
In 1854 the argument for a general property tax was advanced by
Governor Reid on the theory that it would tend to equalize the tax
burden between the various classes. 46 This fight was apparently won
when the constitution of 1868 required the taxation of all real and
personal property, by a uniform rule and "according to its true value
in money".

47

But the fiat of the constitutional convention was not accepted without
further struggle. In Pullen v. Raleigh, the first case involving this
constitutional provision to come before the court, the city of Raleigh
sought to levy a tax on the solvent credits of a resident. The taxpayer
pointed out (1) that the city charter authorized taxation of eight
N. C.

PUB. LAWS 1782, c. 7, §1.
N. C. CoNsr. (1868), art. V, §3.

'

N. C. PuB. LAWS 1784, c. 1, §1.

N. C. CoNsT. (1936) art. V, §3.

MACON, A FISCAL HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA (1932) 92 et seq., 105 et seq.
23 CLARK, STATE RECORDS OF NORTH CAROLINA 45.

*'
N. C. PuR. LAWS 1778, c. 26, §1.
45
MACON, A FISCAL HISTORY OF NORTH CAROLINA (1932) 250 et seq.
"Governor's message 1854, p. 16.
' N. C. CoxsT. (1868) art. V, §3.
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specific items not including solvent credits, (2) that Article 9, Section
7, of the state constitution limited the taxing power of cities and towns
to "property", at most, and that the word "property" did not include
solvent credits, and (3) that neither charter nor constitution authorized
the tax. The court in accepting this argument observed: "The word
'property' about which so much was said on the argument, is not used
in that enumeration of the subject of taxation [in the city charter]. In
regard to that word, by the bye, we see that the Constitution does not
make it include 'money, credits, investments in bonds', etc. 'Real and
personal property' is used in a sense to exclude such 'credits and investments'. Art. 5, see. 3". 48 Fourteen years later the court accepted this
limited definition of the word "property", even under a charter authorizing the town to tax "all personal property" therein.49
Curiously enough a conflicting interpretation of this constitutional
provision was developing in the same court at the same time. Three
years after the pronouncement in Pullen v. Raleigh, another case involving the same constitutional provision came before the court."0 The general assembly had authorized the city of Charlotte to tax "all real and
personal property", and the city had levied a tax on the solvent credits
of the plaintiff taxpayer. Counsel repeated the once successful argument, but here the court rejected it on the theory that Article 5, Section
3, authorized the state to tax solvent credits and all "personal property",
that the state had authorized the city of Charlotte to tax solvent credits
and all "personal property", that Article 9, Section 7, was a limitation
of taxing method and not of taxing power, and that even if it were a
limitation of taxing power the word "property" included solvent credits.
Later in the same year the question came again before the court.r1
Under authority to tax the "real estate" of its inhabitants, Elizabeth
City had levied a tax on real estate only. An objecting taxpayer argued
that Article 9, Section 7, required that taxes be levied on "all property",
real arid personal, including solvent credits; and the court so held. At
the same term, the court went even further and upheld a tax imposed
by the city of Fayetteville on shares of stock even though the power to
tax this specific item was not mentioned in the city charter., 2

"It is

S 68 N. C. 451, 456 (1873).
"Vaughan v. Murfreesboro, 96 N. C. 317, 2 S. E. 676 (1887).
Wilson v. Charlotte, 74 N. C. 748 (1876).
Cobb v. Elizabeth City, 75 N. C. 1 (1876).
Kyle v. Commissioners, 75 N. C. 445 (1876). "It is admitted", said Justice
Bynum, "that the town of Fayetteville possesses the power of taxation for corporate purposes, by virtue of its charter and the general laws of the state....
This concession, we think, is decisive of the case before us. For whenever the
power is exercised, all taxes whether state, county or town, by force of the constitution, must -be imposed upon all the real and personal property, money, credits,
investments in bonds, stock, joint-stock companies, or otherwise, situate in the
state, county or town, except property exempted by the constitution." Id. at 446.
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the provision, and was the purpose of the Constitution", said Justice
Bynum, "that thereafter there should be no discrimination in taxation
in favor of any class, person or interest, but that everything, real and
personal, possessing value as property, and the subject of ownership,
shall be taxed equally and by a uniform rule. In this respect the present
constitution shows no favors and allows no discretion. If, then, the
town of Fayetteville has the power to tax, the constitution steps forward
and commands that all property shall be taxed and by a uniform rule.
comprise the
Shares in a national bank are investments in stock, and
53
largest portion of the moneyed wealth of the country."
These conflicting viewpoints developing in the same court at the same
time clashed in the decisive case of Redmond v. Commissioners of Tarboro.5 4 The general assembly had authorized the town of Tarboro to
"levy a tax on all real and personal property" in the town. The town
levied a tax on "all property ... both real and personal, including all
moneys, credits in bonds, stocks, joint stock companies or otherwise."
A taxpayer owning solvent credits protested and appealed to the court.
It was there argued for the taxpayer5 5 (1) that far from prohibiting
classification of property the constitution itself had resorted to four distinct classifications: first, a capitation tax; second, a tax on moneys,
credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint stock companies or otherwise
"which must be taxed according to a uniform rule"; third, a tax on all
real and personal property according to its true value in money; fourth,
a tax on trades, professions, franchises and incomes; (2) that the gelaeral assembly therefore had the power to classify personal property into
tangibles and intangibles, and the power to authorize the town of Tarboro to do so, and when it authorized Tarboro to levy a tax upon "all
real and personal property" it was using the words in the restricted
sense excluding solvent credits.
The court overruled this argument and held:5 (1) That the constitution commands that all property be taxed. "In the absence of constitutional limitations," said Justice Shepherd, "there is, it is said, no
restraint whatever upon the Legislature, and it may discriminate in
favor of or against a particular class of persons or property, and pass
Id. at 447.
106 N. C. 122, 10 S. E. 845 (1890).
Id. at 143, 10 S. E. at 851 et seq.
Id. at 125, 10 S. E. at 846. "The check upon such an abuse of power", con-

tinued Justice Shepherd, "is in the influence of the constituents over their representatives; and the weight of authority is that the courts have no right to interfere

with this exercise of the legislative will. Thus it is seen that a wide field is
open for a war between different classes of property, in that one class may be

taxed to the exclusion or to the prejudice of another, and that under the forms

of a free government, an excited partisan legislative majority may commit wrongs
against the rights of property as flagrant and oppressive as those which have dis-

graced the reigns of the most despotic rulers.'
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laws in violation of every principle of just government, by an unequal
distribution of the public burdens. .. "
(2) The court further held 57 that the word "property" includes
moneys, credits, investments and other choses in action because the
spirit of the constitution requires it. "Clear and convincing indeed,
then, must be the reasoning which gives a restricted meaning to the
word 'property' when used in reference to municipal taxation, while, as
to all other taxation, it is to be taken in its natural and general sense.
Upon what principle can it be contended that one who has no tangible
property, but who owns a hundred thousand dollars in solvent credits,
may enjoy all of the conveniences, safeguards and other benefits of town
life, and contribute nothing whatever in the payment of common expenses? Yet such will be the effect if the restricted interpretation contended for is to prevail.... No good reason can be assigned in support
of such-an unjust discrimination, while every principle of justice and
common fairness sternly forbids it."
Thus, the uniform and ad valorem requirements for a general property tax, fought for from colonial days, put periodically into the statute
law thereafter, and embodied in the constitution of 1868, was in 1890
made to stick at least in theory. In taxing certain classes of intangibles,
however, the state did not go as far in practice as it went in theory.
The general assembly prior to 1868 allowed the taxpayer to deduct the
amount of his debts from the total value of his solvent credits ;'$ in 1869
it allowed him to deduct the rent due for the current year on taxable
property;59 and this policy of deductions was continued without interruption, in varying forms, in the years that followed. In 1918 a constitutional amendment60 made a further dent in the theory and practice
by requiring the general assembly to exempt "from taxes of every kind":
notes, mortgages, and all other evidence of indebtedness, made to run
for not less than five nor more than twenty years, given in good faith for
the purchase price of a home, when the purchase price does not exceed
three thousand dollars, and the interest rate does not exceed five and
one-half per cent. Another constitutional amendment in 192461 extended
the 1918 exemption (1) to fifty per cent of the value of notes, mortgages
and all other evidence of indebtedness, or any renewal thereof, (2)
given in good faith to build, repair or purchase a home, (3) when said
loan does not exceed eight thousand dollars . . . provided, (4) the holder
thereof resides in the county where the land lies and there lists it for
taxation, and (5) "provided further that when said notes and mortgages
are held and taxed in the county where the house is situated, then the
-7 Id. at 130, 10 S. E. at 848.
N. C. Pu. LAWS 1866-67, c. 72, Schedule A, Class 1.
LAWS 1868-69, c. 74, §12.
"N.
'IN. C.
C. Pu.
Co-sT. (1918) art. V, §3.
61N. C. Co.sT. (1924) art. V, §3.
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owner of the house shall be exempt from taxation of every kind for
fifty per cent of the value of said notes or mortgages". This exemption
was nullified by the constitutional amendment of 1936, 62 and the general assembly in 1937 washed away the words of the statutes giving
effect to it.
Also, in taxing corporate stocks the general assembly's practice lid
not always" square with constitutional theory. In 1869 it did not tax
63
corporate stocks when the property of the corporation was taxed,
though the courts all along recognized corporate stocks as property in
the hands of the shareholder apart from the property of the corporation;
in 1874 it went all the way and taxed stock in the hands of the shareholder as well as the property in the hands of the corporation;64 in
1881 it permitted the shareholders a deduction from the value of their
shares proportioned to that part of the value of the corporate property
on which the corporation had already paid a tax to this state; in
1887 it lifted this tax from the individual shareholder and put it on? the
corporation in form of a tax on capital stock ;66 in 1929 it exempted
the individual shareholder if the corporation paid either a tax on capital
stock or a franchise tax ;67 in 1935 it repealed the "capital stock" or
"corporate excess" tax as to ordinary domestic business corporations,
but left shares of stock in such corporations tax exempt if the corporation paid a franchise tax ;6 today, it taxes all shares of stock owned by
residents of this state or having a business, commercial or taxable situs
here, with exemption for shares in corporations which pay a franchise
tax, together with a tax on net income. 69 In 1917 the general assembly
lifted the tax from holders of stock in foreign corporations if two-thirds
of such corporations'. property was taxed in North Carolina, and if the
corporation paid a franchise tax on all its capital stock;1O in 1919 it
further lightened this tax,rl and in 1923 exempted shares of stock in
foreign corporations altogether ;72 in 1931, it resumed taxation of such
shares but gave the shareholder an alternative of paying a flat income
11 N. C. CoNsT. (1936) art. V, §3.
'IN. C. Pu. LAws 1868-69, c. 74, §13(6).
1,N. C. PUB. LAWS 1873-74, c. 133, §9(6).
"5N. C. PuB. LAWS 1881, c. 117, §9(6).

66
N. C.
PuB. LAWS 1887, c. 137, §§14, 42.
'IN.
C. PUB. LAWS 1929, c. 344, §306(9).
"IN. C. PuB. LAWs 1935, c. 417, §306(9) ; c. 371, §215(d).
N. C. PUB. LAWS 1939, c. 158, §§215(4), 705.
N. C. PUB. LAWS 1917, c. 231, §4.
N. C. PuB. LAws 1919, c. 90, §4, provided that an individual stockholder in
a foreign corporation need not pay a property tax on his shares if either (1) twothirds in value of the issuing corporation's property was taxed in North Carolina,
or (2> the issuing corporation had tangible assets in this state which exceeded in
value the aggregate par value of the total stock owned by residents of this state,
and1also paid a franchise tax to this state on its entire capital stock.
N. C. PUB. LAws 1923, c. 4, §4.
70

11
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tax of 6 per cent on all dividends received on the stock;78 in 1937 it
continued taxation of such shares but exempted the shareholder if the
issuing corporation paid both a franchise and an income tax to this
74
state.
This legislative policy did not pass unquestioned in the courts. In
Person v. Watts,75 a taxpayer sought to compel the listing of shares of
stock in the hands of the individual shareholder as well as the capital
stock of the corporation on the theory that the exemption violated the
constitutional requirement that all property be taxed by a uniform rule
and according to its true value in money. The court, however, rejected
this argument, and in saying by way of dicta that the exemption was
valid, reasoned as follows :76 The constitution requires "that laws be
passed taxing by a uniform rule all moneys, credits, investments in
It" is the investment that is to be
bonds, stocks ... or otherwise....
taxed, not necessarily the shares or certificates of stock. . . . The
truth is, the certificate of stock represents the shareholder's investment
in the corporation as the land owner's deed represents his investment
in the land. If the land is taxed, why tax the deed? If the capital
stock is taxed, why tax the certificates which represent the capital stock?
No doubt the Legislature possesses the power to repeal the statute and
to tax both ... but if the constitution does not require it, why should
the additional burden be imposed?"
Chief Justice Clark dissented :'7 "The constitution forbids expressly
the exemption of stocks and bonds, but it is clearly violated. There is
no more reason that the owners of the stocks which the corporations
have sold .. . should be exempted from taxation than that their bonds
.. . should be exempt. . " Payment of a franchise tax, which is
analogous to a license tax paid by lawyers, merchants, and others for
the privilege of carrying on business, he continued, is no ground, as
our court has often held, to grant exemption to stockholders. Neither
is it "double taxation" to tax the shares in the hands of shareholders
.-.

73

N. C. Puj. LAWS 1931, c. 427, §215(g).

7'N. C. PuB. LAws 1937, c. 127, §§215(d)-(e), 706. The 1937 act levied W0c
on every $100 in excess of $300 value on all shares of stock, whether of a domestic

or foreign corporation, held by a resident, except shares in corporationswhich paid

. franchise and income tax to this state.
N. C. Pun. LAWS 1939, c. 158, §705, limited this exemption somewhat by exempting shares entirely only when the issuing corporation pays a franchise tax to
this state on its entire capital stock or gross receipts, together with a tax upon all
of its net income. When the issuing corporation pays a franchise tax on only
part.of its capital stock or gross receipts and on only part of its total net income,
then there is exempted that portion of the value of the shares of the individual
shareholder "as is represented by the percentage of net income on which tax is

paid to this state". The 1939 act also repealed the $300 exemption noted in the
1937 act.

S5184 N. C. 499, 115 S. E. 336 (1922).
at 508, 115 S. E. at 342.
"6Id.
7
Id. at 552 et seq., 115 S. E. at 350 et seq.
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when taxes have been laid upon the tangible property and capital stock
of the corporation itself-this has been held repeatedly by both the Court
of the United States and this state.
Again in Person v. Doughton,78 the plaintiff sought to invalidate a
statute exempting from taxation all shares of stock in foreign corporations held by residents of this state. The court reiterated its former
opinion over an even stronger dissent of Chief Justice Clark 9 to the
effect that here with the corporation located outside the state neither
the corporate property nor the shares would be taxed and thus less
ground existed for upholding this statute than in the Watts case, where
the corporate property was taxed at least to the corporation.
Thus, it is apparent that the 1868 constitutional idea of property
taxation "by a uniform rule, and according to its true value in money"
may have been measurably achieved in the taxation of real property,
and in the taxation of tangible personal property, but not in the taxation
of intangible personal property. The song of classification ended with
the constitution of 1868, but the melody lingered on for sixty-eight
years, and came back with a fresh burst of song in the amendment of
1936. Whether classification may be carried to the exemption point
is as yet undecided by the court. The probabilities will be discussed in
the following sections dealing with tax exemptions.
IV
PROPERTY EXEMPT FROm TAxEs
From the foregoing discussions it is obvious that for a great part
of the period from 1663 to 1868, and for many types of property, exemption was the rule and taxation the exception; it is equally obvious
that multiplying governmental units and expanding governmental services gradually extended the specifically enumerated items of property
subject to taxation until they covered so nearly all items that it was an
easy transition from the exemption of all property unless specifically
taxed to the taxing of all property unless specifically exempted-making
taxation the rule and exemption the exception.
The first specific exemptions, already indicated, appeared in the
Concessions of 166580 and covered the lands of "us the Lords P5ropryators". Later, exemptions from all taxes for one year and then for
ten years were offered to influence settlers to come here to live.8 ' Later,
in the interest of internal development it became the fashion to exempt
Is186 N. C. 723, 120 S. E. 481 (1923).
1Id. at 727, 120 S. E. at 483.
80 5 THORPE, AMERIcAN CHARTERS, CONSTITUTIONS AND ORGANIC LAWS (1909)
2758.
8
" CONNOR, NORTH CAROLINA: REBUILDING AN ANCIENT COMMONWEALTH 96;
1 SAUNDERS, COLONIAL REcoRDs 183-7.
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the property of certain internal improvement companies. To illustrate:
In 1834 the general assembly chartered the Bank of Cape Fear and in
the charter imposed a tax of twenty-five cents on each share of bank
stock with the provision that "the said bank shall not be liable to any
further tax". 2 In 1830 it chartered the Petersburg Railroad Company,
providing that "all machines, wagons, vehicles and carriages purchased
with the funds of the company, and all works constructed under authority of this act, and all profits which shall accrue from the same . . .
shall be exempt from all public charge or tax whatsoever . . .";83 in
1852 it chartered the Raleigh and Gaston Railroad providing that "all
the property thereof of any description shall be exempt from any public
charge or tax whatsoever for the term of fifteen years and thereafter
the legislature may enforce a tax not exceeding five cents per annum on
individuals whenever the annual
each share of the capital stock held8 by
4
profits shall exceed eight per cent."
These exemptions became embarrassing as the property of these
companies accumulated and complaints of tax paying property owners
increased. When the general assembly sought to withdraw these exemptions the court interfered. "This cannot be. It would be in direct
violation of the pledged faith of the state."8 5 Later the court began to
construe these express provisions more strictly. "It is equally well
settled", said the court in Raleigh Gaston Railroad Compaoty v. Reid,80
"that contracts made by the state with individuals, in granting charters,
are not to be construed by the same rules as contracts between individuals. In the latter, the rule of the common law, which is the same
as common sense, is 'words are to be taken in the strongest sense against
the party using them'; on the idea that self-interest induces a man to
select words most favorable for himself. It is otherwise when the state
is a party; for it is known that in obtaining charters, although the
sovereign is presumed to use the words, in point of fact the bills are
drafted by individuals seeking to procure the grant, and that 'the promoters', as they are styled in England, or the 'lobby members', as they
N. C. PuB. LAWS 1833-34, c. 1, §11.
'IN. C. PuB. LAws 1830-31, c. 56, §17.
II N. C. Puv. LAWS 1852, c. 140, §8.
8" Bank of Cape Fear v. Edwards, 27 N. C. 516, 517 (1845).
8

Accord: Bank

of Cape Fear v. Denning, 29 N. C. 55 (1846); State v. Petway, 55 N. C. 396
(1856) ; Attorney General v. Bank of Charlotte, 57 N. C. 287 (1858).
8664 N. C. 155, 158 (1870). Accord: Richmond & Danville R. R. v. Commissioners, 74 N. C. 506 (1876); Richmond & Danville R. R. v. Commissioners,
76 N. C. 212 (1877) ; Petersburg R. R. v. Commissioners, 81 N. C. 487 (1879) ;
Belo v. Commissioners, 82 N. C. 415 (1880) ; Richmond & Danville R. R. v. Commissioners, 84 N. C. 504 (1881); Atlantic, Tennessee & Ohio R. R. v. Commissioners, 87 N. C. 129 (1882) ; Raleigh & Gaston R. R. v. Commissioners, 87 N. C.
414 (1882); Cheraw & Salisbury R. R. v. Commissioners, 88 N. C. 519 (1883);
Worth v. Wilmington & Weldon R. R., 89 N. C. 291 (1883); Worth v. Petersburg,

R. R., 89 N. C. 301 (1883); Wilmington & Weldon R. R. v. Alsbrook, 110 N. C.
137 (1892).
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are styled on this side of the Atlantic, have the charters or acts of incorporation drafted to suit their own purposes; and a matter of this
kind, instead of being, in its strict sense, a contract, is more like the
act of an indulgent head of a family dispensing favors to its different
members, and yielding to importunity. So the courts, to save the old
gentleman from being stripped of the very means of existence, by
sharp practice have been forced to reverse the rule of construction, and
to adopt the meaning most favorable to the grantor."
The constitutional limitation of exemptions in 1868 prevented this
type of exemption for the future, but did not eliminate exemptions already granted; however, the court allowed the general assembly increasing freedom to levy other types of taxes than property taxes until the
exemptions became less and less valuable and finally were surrendered
altogether.
A. PROPERTY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY

Must

EXEMPT

When the 1868 convention wrote into the constitution the provision
that the general assembly must exempt (1) "property belonging to the
state or to municipal corporations", and the provision that it might
exempt (2) "cemeteries, and property held for educational, scientific,
literary, charitable, or religious purposes; also (3) wearing apparel,
arms for muster, household and kitchen furniture, the mechanical and
agricultural implements of mechanics and farmers, libraries, and scientific
instruments, to a value not exceeding three hundred dollars", 2 it was
again giving expression to a policy which had evolved out of experience
reaching back to the beginning of the province of North Carolina.
"Property Belonging to the State or to Municipal
Corporations"
Revenue acts had long exempted "all lands or other property belonging to this State", or to "any county in this State"; "all town halls,
market houses and other public structures and edifices, and all lots or
squares kept open for health, use or ornament, belonging to any city,
town or village"; "all fire engines and other implements used for the
extinguishment of fire, with the buildings exclusively used and necessary for the safekeeping thereof".8 7 The 1868 constitution simply
summed up this legislative policy, broadened it, and converted a permissive into a mandatory exemption. For nearly twenty years thereafter the general assembly followed with almost literal exactness the
wording of the constitution by exempting property "belonging to . ..
the State, or any county, or incorporated city or town".slb In 1885 it
8
" N. C. CONST. (1868) art. V, §5.
' N. C. PuB. LAWS 1866-67, c. 72, §8.
" N. C. PuB. LAWS 1868-69, c. 74, §14(1); N. C. PUB. LAWS 1881, c. 117,
§12(l).
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limited the exemption to property "used for public purposes".88 Did it
exceed its authority in so doing?
While this constitutional exemption was taking statutory form, two
opposing viewpoints were developing in the court. The 1868 constitutional provision was first called to the court's attention eight years
after its adoption in Atlantic & N. C. R. R. v. Commissioners0 where
the county levied a tax on the property of a railroad two-thirds of whose
stock was owned by the state. The railroad claimed that the two-thirds
interest owned by the state was exempt under the constitution. The
county claimed that the state "stood on a footing with the private stockholders in said company". The court said 91 "We do not think the
exemption in the constitution embraces the interest of the state in business enterprises, but applies to the property of the state held for state
purposes. . . . But where the state steps down from her sovereignty
and embarks with individuals in business enterprises, the same considerations do not prevail." Neither counsel nor court appeared to rely
on the obvious fact that the property taxed was property belonging to
the railroad and not "property belonging to the state". Rather they
proceeded on the theory that the property belonged to the state and was
exempt from taxation only if "held for state purposes".
Fifty-five years later, in Latta v. Jenkins, 2 the North Carolina court
uttered a diametrically opposing dictum: "The mandatory constitutional
provision that property belonging to or owned by the state or municipal corporations shall be exempt from taxation, is in language so clear
and free from ambiguity that ordinarily there is not room for construction, as to its application to specific property." At the same term of
court the same Justice emphasized his former meaning by stating that
such property was exempt without regard to the purpose for which it
was acquired and held, and that if the Machinery Act meant otherwise
it was unconstitutional and void. 93 Thus a clash of dicta ushered in
the battle of exemptions.
The issues involved in this battle of exemptions have been before
the court in six cases in the last ten years. The battle clouds gathered
in all of them; thunder rolled in four; lightning flashed in three; and
in the last, a suffering acquiescence gave a semblance of calm to a situation which one member of the court described as an impermanent
victory.
In one of these cases the property belonged to the state. 94 In five
" N. C. PuB. LAWS 1885, c. 177, §16(1).
" N. C. PuB. LAws 1905, c. 590, §63(1).
90 75 N. C. 474 (1876).
"Id. at 476.

92200 N. C. 255, 258, 156 S. E. 857, 859 (1931).
"'Andrews v. Clay County, 200 N. C. 280, 282, 156 S. E. 855, 857 (1931).
" Weaverville v. Hobbs, Commissioner, 212 N. C. 684, 194 S. E. 860 (1937).
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of them it belonged to municipal corporations.9

5

And in all five cases

these municipal corporations were cities and towns and the taxes were
levied by counties. In three cases the city owned property in the county
96
in which the city was located ;96 in two it was in adjoining counties. a
In the single case of state owned property a city levied the taxes.
The first of the cases97 dealing with municipally owned property
involved a town plant which the town of Andrews built and used to
generate electricity for lighting its streets and municipal buildings and
9 7*
for domestic and commercial uses of its inhabitants. The second case
involved a building which the city of Asheville acquired, through proceedings to realize on collateral security for its deposits in a defunct
bank, and rented out for business purposes. The third" involved lots
acquired by the town of Benson, through foreclosure for non-payment
of taxes, and rented out for business purposes. The fourth99 involved
a hall which the town of Warrenton acquired, through foreclosure to
protect its own investment, and operated as a business enterprise. The
fifth100 involved lots and pieces of real estate acquired by WinstonSalem, through foreclosure to protect its street assessment and tax liens,
some of which were rented out for business purposes, and some of
which were unrented, but all of which were held for resale. The single
case of state owned property involved a house and lot acquired by the
North Carolina Veterans' Loan Fund through foreclosure for nonpayment of a loan to a World War veteran.
Municipally owned property. In the Town of Andrews case 1°" the
court held the municipally owned power plant exempt without a dissenting vote, and the Justice writing the opinion reached back for support to the dictum expressed in Latta v. Jenkins-thatproperty belonging
to a municipal corporation is exempt "because of its ownership and
without regard to the purpose for which such property was acquired
and held. . . ." Four years later, in the Asheville case the court held
the municipally owned office building taxable without a dissenting Vote,
" Andrews v. Clay County, 200 N. C. 280, 156 S. E. 855 (1931); Board of
Financial Control v. Henderson County, 208 N. C. 569, 181 S. E. 636 (1935);
Benson v. Johnston County, 209 N. C. 751, 185 S. E. 6 (1935); Warrenton v.
Warren- County 215 N. C. 342, 2 S. E. (2d) 464 (1939); Winston-Salem v. Forsyth County, 21 N'. C. 704, 9 S. E. (2d) 381 (1940).
.. Benson v. Johnston County, 209 N. C. 751, 185 S. E. 6 (1935) ; Warrenton
v. Warren County, 215 N. C. 342, 2 S. E. (2d) 464 (1939) ; Winston-Salem v.
Forsyth County, 217 N. C. 704, 9 S. E. (2d) 381 (1940).
"'Andrews v. Clay County, 200 N. C. 280, 156 S. E. 855 (1931); Board of

Financial Control v. 'Henderson County, 208 N. C. 569, 181 S. E. 636 (1935).
" Andrews v. Clay County, 200 N. C. 280, 156 S. E. 855 (1931).
" Board of Financial Control v. Henderson County, 208 N. C. 569, 181 S. E.
636 (1935).
2
"Benson v. Johnston County, 209 N. C. 751, 185 S. E. 6 (1935).

"Warrenton
v. Warren
County,
215 N.
S. E.
464 (1939).
...
Winston-Salem
v. Forsyth
County,
217C.N.342,
C. 2704,
9 S.(2d)
E. (2d)
381 (1940).
101 200 N. C. 280, 282, 156 S. R. 855, 856 (1931).
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and the Justice writing the opinion reached back for support to the
dictum expressed in Atlantic and N. C. R. R. v. Commissioners, and
asked :102 "Can the city acquire business property in another county,
hold and rent it, without the payment of taxes in that county? We
think not. The property is not held or used for any governmental or
necessary public purpose, but for purely business purposes." We are
not overruling the Andrews case, said the Justice, we are distinguishing
it-cutting down the scope of the language used-taking some of the
wind out of its sails. The power plant was held for a public purpose
and on that ground is exempt; the office building was held for a business
purpose and on that ground is not exempt. This viewpoint prevailed
the following year in the Town of Benson case,103 where the court decided that a municipally owned house and lot held for rent was held
for a business purpose and therefore taxable; later in the Town of
Warrenton case' 038 when it decided that a hotel, municipally owned
and operated, was likewise taxable because held for a business purpose;
and finally in the Winston-Salem case 04 when it held that vacant lots
and other real estate, some rented for business purposes and some not,
but all held for resale, was also taxable because held for business
purposes.
This presently prevailing viewpoint has grown in clarity of statement and intensity of feeling with the years and has picked up votes
on the way. To illustrate: in 1876 Justice Rodman expressed it as
follows :105 "When the state steps from her sovereignty and embarks
with individuals in business enterprises, she cannot claim exemptions
fully allowed when she engages in governmental enterprises." In 1935
Justice Clarkson brought it forward :108 "If a municipal corporation can
go into a rental business and escape taxation, it would have a special
privilege not accorded to others who are in a like business"; and later
stated it with even stronger feeling:1107 "Since Chief Justice Marshall,
in 1819, laid down the fundamental that 'the power to tax involves the
power to destroy' . . . we have come to recognize another truth-the
power to exempt from taxation also involves the power to destroy.
Used by governments as a shield, it operates as a subsidy of governmental excursions into the field of private enterprise thus placing the
...208 N. C. 569, 571, 181 S. E. 636, 638 (1935).
108 209 N. C. 751, 185 S. E. 6 (1935).
108 215 N. C. 342, 2 S. E. (2d) 464 (1939).
1-217 N. C. 704, 9 S. E. (2d) 381 (1940).

" Atlantic & N. C. R. R. v. Commissioners, 75 N. C. 474, 475 (1876).
'Board of Financial Control v. Henderson County, 208 N. C. 569, 571, 181

"

S. E. 636, 638 (1935).
""Weaverville v. Hobbs, Commissioner, 212 N. C. 684, 693, 194 S. E. 860,

865 (1937).
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private competitor, who bears his share of taxes, at such a disadvantage

that he is fortunate if he is able to survive."
It finds its latest expression in the words of Chief Justice Stacy in
1939:108 "It is only when they step over into the field of private enterprise that the question of taxation arises ....
Exemption is granted

in the Capitol and in the city halls. Taxation is required in the market
place.... When the entity thus clothed with immunity teparts from
the land of immunity and goes into the imperative field of taxation it

sheds its immunity, for in this latter country, it operates neither in the
territory nor in the character of its immunity."
State owned property. The constitution draws no distinction for
tax exemption purposes between property belonging to the state and to
municipal corporations. 10 9 The general assembly apparently desired
no such listinction: when it introduced the "public purpose" limitation
in 1885,110 it put state and municipally owned property on the same
bottom by exempting property "belonging... to this state, or any county,
incorporated city or town, and used for public purposes"; today it exempts 1 "real property, if directly or indirectly owned by . . . this
state, however held, and real property owned by the state for the
benefit of any general or special fund of the state, and real property
lawfully owned and held by counties, cities, townships, or school district, used wholly and exclusively for public or school purposes". Does
the court construe constitution or statute so as to exempt in toto property belonging to the state, but property belonging to municipal corporations only in so far as it is held for a public purpose? In Town of
Weaverville v. Hobbs,"2 the court held that a house and lot acquired
by the North Carolina Veterans' Loan Fund, through foreclosure for
non-payment of a loan to a World War veteran, was exempt from
taxation. But the Justice writing the majority opinion drew no distinction between state and municipally owned property. No one of the
seven Justices now on the court has drawn any such distinction in any
of the cases involving this issue; and one of them has expressly pointed
out the absurdity of any attempt to do so :"3 "The exemption of Federal and State property is stated in the same sentence with that of local
governments without even a period or a semicolon separating the provision as to Federal and State government property from that dealing
with the property of local units. Apparently the phrase 'used wholly and
exclusively for public or school purposes' was intended to apply equally
9
"" Warrenton v. Warren County, 215 N. C. 342, 354, 2 S. E. (2d) 464, 471
(1939).
109 N. C. CONST. (1936) art. V, §5.
110 N. C. PuB. LAws 1885, c. 177, §16(1).
11
"N.
C. Pus. LAWS 1939, c. 310, §600(1).
112212 N. C. 684, 194 S. E. 860 (1937).

..Id.at 690, 194 S. E. at 864.
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to the property of the Federal, State, and local governments. Certainly
there is no clear indication that the General Assembly intended to create
two distinct classes of exemptions.- The phrase 'however held' does not
affect this interpretation ... it is not to be supposed that the General
Assembly intended to lay down two rules with respect to the exemption
of governmental property. The contrary view would result in a holding
to the effect that the General Assembly laid down a more liberal rule
for the Federal and State governments than for local governments,
and to this extent discriminated against the latter. The reasoning of
such a view is not convincing."
The same Justice expresses this viewpoint in even stronger language
in the latest case bearing on this problem :114 "'Property belonging to
the state or to municipal corporations, shall be exempt from taxation'
clearly means that property belonging (1) to the state, or (2) to municipal corporations shall be exempt from taxation on the same basis and
by the same rule. Here is a sentence with one subject, one verb, one
verb phrase, and one participle, the latter taking two prepositional
phrases as objects, the one relating to the 'State' and the other to
'municipal corporations'. Elementary rules of grammar compel the
admission, it seems to me that this sentence in our constitution laid
down a simple fundamental proposition, equally applicable to the State
and to municipal corporations. The expressed intent to 'feed out of
the same spoon' the State and all municipal corporations seems clear."
"However", continued the Justice, "our cases do not so hold. The
rule of Benson v. Johnston County, supra, permits the taxation of
municipal property not used for a public purpose, while the rule of
Weaverville v'. Hobbs, supra, exempts all state property from taxation
irrespective of the character of the use. To speak boldly, this is discrimination, and discrimination of 'a type for which I can find no
justification in our constitution.... In my opinion, the majority opinion
here should so amplify the rule of Benson v. Johnston County, supra,
as to make it plain that the soundness of the rule of Weavervile v.
Hobbs, supra, may hereafter be open to serious question, and thus put
officials and taxing authorities on notice that the rule in the Weaverille

case, supra,may hereafter be the subject of a close scrutiny at the hands
of this court."
If the opinion of this Justice is the opinion of the court on this
point and state and municipally owned property stand on the same
bottom, it follows from the Warrenton case that property belonging to
the state, even as property belonging to municipal corporations, is not
exempt from taxation unless it is held for a public purpose; and that the
""4Warrenton v. Warren County, 215 N. C. 342, 349, 2 S. E. (2d) 464, 467

(1939).
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Warrenton case overrules the Weaverville case unless it appears that the
property in the Weaverville case was held for a public purpose. Granting that no distinction is drawn between state and municipally owned
property for tax exemption purposes, how can it be said that an office
building held by a city for rent, as in the Asheville case, is held for a
business purpose even if the rents are applied to. city purposes; or that
a house and lot held by a city for rent, as in the Benson case, is held
for a business purpose even if the rents are applied to city purposes-; or
that a hotel owned and operated by a city is held for a business purpose,
even if the rents are applied to city purposes; but that a house and lot
held by a state agency for rent is held for a public purpose merely
because the rent is applied to state purposes? It is true that the Justice
writing the opinion in the Weaverille case"15 says that "the facts on
which the decisions of this court [in the Asheville and Benson cases]
were based, are distinguishable from those in the case at bar", and
argues that the state owned house and lot was held for a public purpose; but it is equally true that this opinion, the concurring opinion,
and the opinions from which they quote rest on the underlying philosophy that all property belonging to the state or to municipal corporations is exempt from taxation, and not on whether a particular purpose
is a public or a business purpose. It is also true that the majority
opinion in the Warrenton case disavows any intent to overrule the
Weaverville case:"16 "The instant case is distinguishable'from Andrews
v. Clay County, and Weaverville v. Hobbs, Commissioner . .

.

.relied

upon by the appellant, in that in both of these cases the property sought
to be taxed was owned and used for governmental or public purposes,
in the former case for the erection of a power plant to generate electricity to light, and otherwise serve the owner, a municipality, and in
the latter case for the purpose of assisting World War veterans in the
acquisition of homes." It is to be noted, however, that three of the
Justices concurring in the result reached in the majority opinion obviously avoid any effort to distinguish the Warrenton and Weaverville
cases on the theory that the property in one is held for a business purpose
and in the other for a public purpose; and that a fourth Justice concurring in the result flatly says it can't be done :l1 "It [the majority
opinion] attempts to distinguish the Weaverville case, supra, from the
instant majority opinion by pointing out that in the Weaverville case,
supra, the money received from the property went to the World War
Veterans' Fund and in the present case the receipts are put in the
Warrenton treasury. In the Weaverville case, supra, the dwelling was
15 212 N. C. 684, 688, 194 S. E. 860, 862 (1937).
218
215 N. C. 342, 344, 2 S. E. (2d) 464, 465 (1939).
117
Id. at 349, 2 S. E. (2d) at 467.
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rented by the state; here the hotel is rented by the town. The distinction appears to be one without a difference. Certainly the factual
similarity of the tywo cases is striking, and one inviting the application
of the same rule. In dissenting in the Weaverville case, supra, I there
urged the application of the rule of the instant case; the Chief Justice
and the Justice who here speaks for the majority, indicated views in
the Weaverville case, supra, in accord with those which I there urged
and now repeat. I am more strongly convinced than ever, in the light
of facts of the instant case, that the result here reached is correct and
that the decision in Weaverville v. Hobbs, supra, was incorrect."
Public Purpose. With tax exemption of municipally owned property thus expressly limited, and of state owned property limited by
implication, to property held for a public purpose, client, counsel and
court are brought face to face with another disturbing problem-what
is a public purpose? This problem is complicated by variation of statement by the court: it has limited the exemption to property held for a
"public use or purpose", for a "governmental and public purpose", and
for a "governmental and necessary public purpose". Certainly purposes
which the court has held to constitute "necessary expenses" would come
without question within the scope of public purpose.118 It is obvious,
however, that "public purposes" for which public money may be spent
cover a much larger ground than "necessary expenses" for which taxes
may be levied and money borrowed without the direct approval of a
majority of the qualified voters. It is less obvious but perhaps accurate
to say that they include many, but not all, of those things which have
been held to be non-necessary but not non-governmental purposes.110
118 For a full discussion of the problems concerning "necessary expenses" see
Coates and Mitchell, Necessary Expenses (1940) 18 N. C. L. Rev. 93. The following items have been held to be necessary expenses: (1) the ordinary expenses
of government, including salaries and wages and office expense (decisions specifically mention salaries of mayor, treasurer, city attorney, janitor, county commissioners' pay, county attorney, sheriff's salary and expense of sheriff's office, register
of deeds' salary and expense of office, clerk superior court's salary and expense
of office, county accountant's salary, police, jurors' fee, feeding and care of prisoners, tax listing expense, expense of holding elections, etc.); (2) the building
and repair of municipal buildings such as city halls, county courthouse, guardhouses and jails, fire alarm systems, fire stations and sites thereof, police station,
office rent for suitable headquarters, etc.; (3) the building and repair of public
roads, streets, and bridges; (4) the building and repair of market houses; (5) the
building and repair of county homes and the maintenance of the poor; (6) furnishing adequate water supply, including the digging of wells, contracting for water
supply, building of waterworks plants; (7) the building of sewerage systems;
(8) the building of electric light plants; (9) performing autopsy, maintenance of
the public peace, and other phases of the administration of justice; (10) fire insurance for school buildings; (11) incinerators; (12) parks and playgrounds;
(13) professional services in refunding bonds; (14) contract with hospital for
care of indigent sick and afflicted poor; (15) jetties; (16) abattoir; (17) county
farm 9agent's salary; and (18) cemeteries.
" Ibid. The following items have been held to be non-necessary expenses:
(1) liquor dispensary; (2) county stock fence; (3) chamber of commerce; (4)
wharves and docks; (5) cotton platform; (6) county and city hospital; (7) munic-

1941]

THE BATTLE OF EXEMPTIONS

Is public purpose still broader and co-extensive with all things the
general assembly may now or in the future authorize the state or local
units to do? Justice Seawell pointedly raised'this question in the Warrenton case :120 "Article VII, section 7, of the constitution clearly recognizes that municipalities may carry on activities unessential to
government and that proprietary ownership of facilities for that purpose may legitimately take place. Under the provisions of the constitution, as a consequence easily foreseen at the time of its adoption,
municipalities have been permitted, under appropriate legislative authority, to acquire, hold, and use property, which this court now declares
not to be within contemplation of a co-ordinate clause of the same
document which exempts, upon its face, all property of municipalities,
comprehensively and without distinction. That property of this sort
might be acquired and held and might come- within the protective
provision of this clause, as well as other clauses of the constitution
likewise general in their nature, was as well known, both presumptively
and actually, to those who phrased the constitution and those who
adopted it as it is to us. . .
The court has long pointed out that public money can be spent only
for a public purpose. In Wood v. Oxford,121 Chief Justice Smith in a
concurring opinion said: "If the matter of the present action were res
integra, and the question involved in the appeal an open one, I should
be reluctant to give assent to the proposition that a municipal corporation, even under legislative sanction and with an approving popular
vote, may make a donation of its bonds to a railroad company in aid
of its work, and impose taxes for their payment. It certainly cannot
do this to advance any mere business enterprise not of a public nature,
for the incidental and substantial benefits its successful prosecution may
confer upon a community in the midst of which it is carried on. .. ."
But what is the test to be applied in determining a "public purpose"?
In drawing the line between public purposes and business purposes for
tax exemption, will the court adopt the distinction between governmental
and proprietary functions used to determine municipal liability for torts?
Or the distinction between a public use and a private use in eminent
domain cases, determining whether private property may be taken for
public use with compensation? Or assuming rejection of the view that
all purposes for which public money may be spent are public purposes, 122 will draw a narrower line, suggested by its own opinions
ipal airport; (8) city auditorium; (9) schools; (10)

public library; (11)

land

and buildings for athletic and recreational purposes; (12) railroads; and (13)
"fire drill tower".
20 215 N. C. 342, 363, 2 S. E. (2d) 464, 476 (1939).
'2
97 N. C. 227, 234, 2 S. E. 653, 656 (1887).
The court has specifically held that public purposes for which public money
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in tax exemption cases, and exclude from the area of public purpose
all property held and used in competition with private business enterprise? This latter test leads into still deeper water. Suppose private
enterprise opens a field of enterprise which state and municipal corporations later decide to enter, as happened in the instance of schools,
waterworks, electricity, and other activities, where governmental activity has sometimes eliminated private competition and in others still
continues it-should property owned by the state and municipal corporations be exempt from taxation while engaged in these enterprises?
Conversely, if the government initiates activity and private enterprise
follows on its heels, should the government lose its tax exemption when
private enterprise invades the field ?123
may be spent include: the State Fair, Briggs v. Raleigh, 195 N. C. 223, 141 S.E.
597 (1928); port terminil facilities, Webb v. The Port Commission, 205 N. C.
663, 172 S. E. 377 (1933) ; railway terminal facilities, Hudson v. Greensboro, 185
N. C. 502, 117 S. E. 629 (1923) ; public housing under federal -housing acts, Wells
v. Housing Authority, 213 N. C. 744, 197 S. E. 693 (1938) ; World War Veterans'
Loan Fund, Hinton v. Lacy, State Treasurer, 193 N. C. 496, 137 S.E. 669 (1927) ;
a state park, Yarborough v. Park Commission, 196 N. C. 284, 145 S. E. 563
(1928); a public auditorium, Adams v. Durham, 189 N. C. 232, 126 S. E. 611
(1925); State Teachers' Training School, Cox v. Commissioners, 146 N. C. 584,
60 S. E. 516 (1908); and aid to railroads, Wood v. Oxford, 97 N. C. 227, 2 S.E.
653 (1887). What tests underlie these conclusions? "A chief purpose of counties,
cities and towns", said the court in Wood v. Oxford, supra, "is to secure public
advantage and convenience, and then public prosperity by means of public works
and enterprises, set on foot and projected through themselves, or individuals, or
corporations, and it can make no difference whether such works are encouraged
by a county or town by taking the capital stock of a corporation, or by a donation
of 'money or credit to it." In Briggs v. Raleigh, supra, the court says: "Many
objects may be public in the general sense that their attainment will confer a public
benefit or promote the public convenience but not be public in the sense that the
taxing power of the state may be used to accomplish them. . . . After mature
reflection, we are constrained to place the present proposition (State Fair) in the
category of a public municipal -purpose, though it is confessed that much might
be said in favor of locating it in another field. . .

."

In Wells v. Housing Authority,

supra, "It is not questioned that it is a proper function of government to promote
the health, safety, and morals of its citizens. . . . The state cannot enact laws
and cities and towns cannot pass effective ordinances forbidding disease, vice and
crime to enter into the slums of overcrowded areas, there defeating every purpose for which civilized government exists, and spreading influences detrimental
to law and order; but experience has shown that this result can be more effectively
brought about by the removal of physical surroundings conducive to these conditions. This is the objective of the act, and these are the means by which it is
intended to accomplish it." The court will be called upon to draw finer distinctions than these in order to determine what property is held for a "public purpose"
in tax exemption cases.
.2There is one remaining question to be faced under the constitutional provisions exempting from taxation the property belonging to the state and to
municipal corporations: What is a municipal corporation? In N. C. PuB. LAws
1868-69, c. 74, §1, the legislative exemption applied to counties and incorporated
cities and towns, and in N. C. PUB. LAWS 1905, c. 590, §63(1), school districts were
added-all clearly within the meaning of the term "municipal corporations". But
"Drainage districts", said the court in Drainage Commissioners v. Webb, 160 N. C.
594, 596, 76 S.E. 552, 553 (1912), "do not come within the definition of 'municipal
corporations 'in Constitution Article V, section 5". Thereafter the legislature
labeled as municipal corporations: drainage districts, N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie,
1939) §5312; electric membership corporations, N. C. PuB. LAWS 1935, c. 291,
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The foregoing analysis is not intended to convey the impression that
the battle of exemptions is finally won by the present court majority.
A dissenting Justice looking back over the successive contests says :124
".... this series of cases will probably, in a minor way, go down in
legal history classed with those differences within the court where the
opposing forces have surged from this side to that of the juridical
battlefield, with varying success to impermanent victory."
Nor is it intended to convey the impression that all the argument
is on the side of the presently winning group. The Chief Justice in
speaking for the group says :125 "It must be conceded that the current
of authority on the question here presented is wanting in clarity, if not
in consistency. A definitive decision is perhaps devoutly to be wished.
But again it is discovered that we have studied the same books and
learned different lessons; read the same lines and construed them not
alike."
Nor is it intended to convey the impression that successions of
somersaults have been turned by members of the present court. Much
of the confusion, which the court admits, is due to changing personnel
and not to changing viewpoints of individual Justices. To illustrate:
when the Andrews case was decided without dissent in 1931, the court
included Chief Justice Stacy, and Justices Adams, Clarkson, Connor
and Brogden. When the Asheville case was decided with dissent in
1935, limiting the scope of the exemption, as set forth in the Andrews
case to property held for a public purpose, Justice Schenck had succeeded Justice Adams on the court. When the Benson case was decided
in 1936, reaffirming the limitation imposed in the Asheville case, Justice
Devin, who had succeeded Justice Brogden, dissented. When the Warrenton case was decided in 1938 Justice Seawell had succeeded Justice
Connor and Justices Barnhill and Winborne had been added to the court.
Justice Clarkson who wrote the majority opinions in the Asheville and
Benson cases and Chief Justice Stacy and Justice Schenck who had
voted with him, were joined by newly appointed Justices Barnhill and
Winborne to make a majority of five, while Justice Devin was joined
by newly appointed Justice Seawell to make a minority of two. Thus,
so far as the exemption of municipally owned property is concerned the
position of majority and minority Justices has been perfectly consistent
from the Asheville decision to date and may be reasonably expected to
continue in the future. When the Weaverville case, concerning the
§14; and housing authorities, N. C. Pun. LAws 1935, c. 456, §9. But is legislative
characterizations conclusive? Clearly the judiciary is the final arbiter. But here
again the court has drawn no clear dividing line between municipal corporations
and other agencies.
..Warrenton v. Warren County, 215 N. C. 342, 358, 2 S. E. (2d) 464, 472

(1939).

-_2Id. at 345, 2 S. E. (2d) at 465.
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exemption of state owned property, was decided in 1938, Justices Devin
and Connor were joined by Justices Barnhill and Winborne to make a
majority of four voting for exemption; while Justices Connor and Devin
maintained the position they had held from the beginning, Justice Devin
in the majority opinion injected the further ground of decision that
the property was held for a public purpose-a position that dissenting
Justices Stacy, Ciarkson and Schenck refused to accept, but which may
have influenced Justices Barnhill and Winborne in reaching their decision. When a case involving exemption of state owned property comes
before the court: On the basis of existing decisions, therefore, Chief
Justice Stacy and Justices Clarkson and Schenck may reasonably be
expected to adhere to their long standing position that state owned
property, like municipally owned property, is not exempt unless held
for a public purpose; Justices Devin and Seawell may reasonably be
expected to adhere to their established positions that state and municipally owned property alike is exempt regardless of the purpose for
which it is held; if Justices Barnhill and Winborne, who have not yet
specifically set forth their views, accept the full implications and underlying philosophy of Chief Justice Stacy's opinion in the Warrenton Pase
in which they joined, they, too, may be expected to vote with Justices
Stacy, Clarkson and Schenck, making a five to two majority for taxing
state owned property unless it is held for a public purpose. It is needless to point out to any lawyer that the foregoing observations at best
are predictions only; and that although there may be some question as
to whether the voice of the people is the voice of God, there is no
question but that the voice of the Justices is the voice of the law so far
as this tax exemption issue is concerned.
This analysis is intended to convey the impression: (1) That this
conflict in the court cannot be resolved by efforts to discover the intention of the constitution makers in 1868. The evidence is too conflicting.
One side can rightly point to the dictum in the Carteret County case as
evidence that when the exemption provision was adopted eight years
before, the constitution makers intended to limit it to property held for
public purposes and give point to the argument with the fact that Justice Rodman who uttered the dictum was a member of the convention
committee that drafted the provision and therefore knew what its makers intended. The other side can point to the fact that the general
assembly put no such construction on the exemption provision for nearly
twenty years after its embodiment in the constitution, as evidence that
the constitution makers had no such intent, especially since many members of the constitutional convention sat in the general assembly in those
years and they, too, knew what its makers intended.
(2) That it cannot be resolved by resort to the language of the
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exemption provision of the constitution and technical rules for the construction thereof on the one hand as against the spirit of the whole
constitution on the other. One side can argue that the other has riveted
its attention on a single sentence of the constitution and forgotten to
observe its surroundings and its setting, so that the forest is obscured
by the trees. The other side can quote poetry in reply to metaphor,
"The forest takes from every tree, its individuality," and go on to suggest that the adversary, by going into other sections of the constitution
in search of a limitation on exemptions not found in the exemption provision, has gone into the forest and got lost in the woods. One side
can point to the next sentence in the constitution authorizing the general assembly to exempt property held for charitable purposes only, as
evidence that the constitution makers intended a like limitation to
apply to property belonging to the state or to municipalities. The
other side can point to the same fact as evidence that the constitution
makers intended it to apply in the one instance and not in the other.
As one Justice said :126 "All this, however, leads to fruitless discussion,
since the majority of the court has the same power to overrule .. .
Weaverville v. Hobbs, as they have to distinguish it from the case at
bar and reinstate the dictum of a twice overruled case and the net result
is the same."
(3) That the conflict is as fundamental as the clash of social forces
over the mutual relations of individual initiative and governmental
enterprise in our governmental structure. One side sees the picture of
multiplying governmental agencies, expanding governmental functions,
intruding governmental action in the field of private enterprise, with
increasing volumes of property coming off the tax books and decreasing
volumes carrying the taxing load, and says that so far as judicial construction of tax exemption provisions may affect the balance between
those contending forces the dye should be cast to make them complete
and equal terms. The other side points out that the acquisition of foreclosed property by governmental units is a "matter of compulsion rather
than of choice", that the policy of the state toward its municipalities
does not justify the fear that they will grow rich through the acquisition
of tax exempt property or thus disturb the equitable balance of taxation, and adds :127 "There is a danger not entirely speculative that
the principle laid down in this decision may react against progress, and
the implication in the concurring opinion that municipal ownership of
property should be cut back to a strictly governmental purpose is discouraging to those who wish to see more put into government than the
,,1271
....
dry12cogs of its necessary operative machinery
27
Id.at 358, 2 S. E. (2d) at 472.
2 Id. at 369, 2 S. E. (2d) at 479.
""'a Though the underlying philosophy of tax exemption appears to be established, its application to concrete issues remains to be worked out as new cases
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EXEMPT

Property which the general assembly may exempt apparently falls
into three classes :128 (1) "cemeteries, and property held for educational,
scientific, literary, charitable, or religious purposes", which it nmay exempt to any amount; (2) "also, wearing apparel, arms for muster,
household and kitchen furniture, the mechanical and agricultural implements of mechanics and farmers, libraries and scientific instruments",
and, by constitutional amendment in 1876, "any other personal property", which it may exempt "to a value not exceeding three hundred
dollars"; (3) "property held and used as the place of residence of the
owner", which it may exempt to a value not exceeding $1000.
CLASS

1

"Cemeteries and property held for educational,scientific,
literary, charitable or religious purposes"
Under this provision of the constitution the general assembly may
exempt all property held for all, part, or none of these purposes. "The
arise and come before the court. To illustrate: While it is clear that a municipally owned power and light system would be tax exempt as for a public purpose
if used to light public buildings of the city, or to supply light and power to the
inhabitants living within the corporate limits, suppose the city extended its lines
outside the corporate limits to serve the surrounding territory-would the power
lines and -property thus used be tax exempt? Or, though it be a "public purpose"
to serve the persons within the corporate limits, does it cease to be such the moment the city limit is reached, and hence, render the property taxable? Is it any
less a public service to furnish a citizen with power and lights merely because he
happens to live just outside the city limits? If so, has not the legislature the
power to extend the city limits for this special purpose alone, and declare it to be
a "public purpose" with respect to taxation? But if it is held not to be a "public
purpose" for tax purposes to serve the inhabitants of the territory surrounding the
city limits, what part of the power system would be taxable and what part nontaxable? That is, if under the statute, the property must be used "wholly and
exclusively" for public purposes, would the use of one plant to generate power
for both the city and surrounding territory render the whole plant taxable as not
being used exclusively for public purposes? Or would a main transmission line
which simultaneously supplied power and lights to people both within and without
the city limits be wholly taxable for the same reason? By analogy, these same
problems arise with respect to municipally owfied water systems and sewerage systems, used to serve citizens living both within and without the city limits.
Are the tests used by the court to determine what is a "public purpose" for
tax purposes applied in the same manner to city, county, special districts and state?
That is, though a particular function be a public pur*ose for a city, need it
necessarily be a public purpose for a county, a special district, or the state? Suppose the legislature creates a special drainage district, or sewerage district, or
rural electrification authority, or housing authority, or port authority, declaring
their respective functions to be "public purposes"--would this legislative declaration alone conclusively establish their tax status?
Must the governmental unit carry on the public function itself, or is the use
of the governmental property for public functions by other agencies sufficient?
That is, suppose a city or county loaned a lot or building to a civic organization,
rent-free, to be used as a playground, public swimming pool, community house,
or public library, etc.-would this render it tax free? Suppose the governmental
unit leased the land to organizations for such purposes-how much weight should
be given the element of profit?
I N. C. CoNsT. (1936) art. V, §5.
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Constitution, Article V, section 5", said Justice Clark12 9 in the first
case construing this provision, "empowers the Legislature to exempt
from taxation 'property held for educational, scientific, literary, charitable
or religious purposes'. This is the limit. The Legislature can exercise
this power to the full extent, or in part, or decline to exempt at all. It
can exempt one kind of property held for such purposes, either realty
or personalty, and tax other kinds. It can exempt partially, as for instance up to a certain value, and tax all above it. It can exempt the
property held for one or more of those purposes and tax that held for
others-as, for instance, it may exempt churches or other property held
for religious purposes, and tax buildings or other property held for
scientific or literary purposes, for the constitutional provision is in the
disjunctive, and authorizes the Legislature to exempt property held for
educational, scientific, literary, charitable or religious purposes ...
Whether the Legislature can discriminate in the same class", continued
the court, "by exempting to a large value the property of a college or
university, and to a smaller amount the property of an academy or high
school, is a large question which is not before us, for there is here no
attempt to discriminate between corporations holding property for the
same purpose, and any expression of opinion on that point would be
obiter dictum."
It follows from this classifying power that the general assembly may
exempt property held for "educational, scientific, literary, charitable or
religious purposes" when it is held by or for educational, scientific,
literary, charitable or religious organizations and tax it when it is held
by or for any other type of organization. This is what the general
assembly has done. Any organization claiming exemption, therefore,
must bring itself within the statutory type as well as within the constitutional purpose.
Who may claim exemption. Property held for the above mentioned
purposes was to some extent exempt before the 1868 convention. To
illustrate: "existing legislative policy exempted graveyards belonging to
churches, religious societies, cities, towns or counties" ;130 and property
belonging to "colleges, institutions, academies, and schools for the education of youth",' 3' or set apart for "divine worship",' 3 2 or for "the
...
United Brethren of Salem v. Commissioners, 115 N. C. 489, 493, 20 S. E.
626 (1894).

For cases in which the court construes other laws passed pursuant

to article V, section 5 of the constitution, consult: Charlotte Building and Loan
Association v. Commissioners, 115 N. C. 410, 20 S. E. 526 (1894); Davis v.
Salisbury, 161 N. C. 56, 76 S. E. 687 (1912) ; Southern Assembly v. Palmer, 166
N. C. 75, 82 S. E. 18 (1914); Trustees of Lees-McRae Institute v. Avery, 184

N. C. 469, 114 S. E. 696 (1922) ; Tarboro v. Forbes, 185 N. C. 59, 116 S. E. 81
(1923); Central Bank & Trust Co. v. Commissioners, 195 N. C. 678, 143 S. E.
252 (1928); Latta v. Jenkins, 200 N. Cz 255, 156 S. E. 857 (1930); Catholic
18725.S. §25.
E. 795 131
(1936).
Society
Gentry,
210 N.1858-59,
C. 579, c.
Ibid.
'32 Ibid.
'10 N.v.C.
PuB. LAws
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propagation of the gospel or used as parsonages", 3 3 or "for the sup13 4
port of the poor and afflicted".
Since 1868 the general assembly has utilized the convenient vagueness of constitutional sanctions and tempered the wind to many a lamb,
shorn and unshorn. To illustrate: Under constitutional authority to
exempt "cemeteries" it approved and extended the pre-existing exemption applying to those owned by "churches, religious societies, cities,
towns or counties", to include those owned by all persons or agencies
not holding for speculation or profit.8 5 It has extended the definition
of "educational" institutions from "The University of this State" 1 0 to
all colleges, academies, industrial schools, seminaries, public libraries or
other institutions of learning.8 3 ' It has extended the definition of "religious" institutions to include all churches and religious bodies. 18 8 It
"8 N. C. PuB. LAWS 1860-61, c. 32, §1.
13
,N. C. PuB. LAWS 1858-59, c. 25, §25
N. C. PuB. LAWS 1939, c. 310, §600(2).
"N. C. REV. STAr. 1836-37, c. 102, §1.

"I7N. C. PUB. LAWS 1939, c. 310, §§600(4), 601(3). From 1868 to the present

time the legislature has varied from a policy of exempting the property of only
certain designated types of educational institutions to one of exempting "all"
educational institutions.
In N. C. PuB. LAWS 1868-69, c. 74, §14(2), the legislature extended the
exemption to (1) the University, (2) colleges, (3) academies, (4) schools for
education of youths and (5) institutes. In N. C. PuB. LAWS 1881, c. 117, §12(2),
the "institutes" was broadened to "institutions of learning"; in N. C. PUB. LAWS
1901, c. 7, §60(4), the legislature added "public library associations organized
under the laws of this state". In N. C. PuB. LAWS 1905, c. 590, §631(4), it
became more specific and extended the exemption only to (1) churches, (2) public
libraries, (3) "incorporated colleges, academies, industrial schools, seminaries, or
other corporate institutions of learning", and (4) the buildings on the lands of
such educational institutions which are used as residences by the officers or instructors of the institutions. Before an exemption could be claimed for personal
property, including endowment funds, from 1905 to 1911, the legislature also
required the institution not to be a corporation having shares of stock or otherwise
owned by individuals, and not to be conducted for the profit of any person or
corporation, directly or under any pretense whatsoever. This apparently did not
apply to real property exemptions, and the whole requirement was removed in
1911. To the above list the legislature, in N. C. Pun. LAWS 1917, c. 234, §72(2),
added the "teachers of public schools of this state", exempting only their private
libraries. In exempting real and personal property held for investment purposes
the legislature has used broader terms than it has in exempting property actually
used by the institution. In N. C. PuB. LAWS 1933, c. 204, §304(4-a), it exempted
real property held for income producing purposes, of "educational", "literary" and
"historical" institutions; and in N. C. Pun. LAws 1937, c. 291, §60(5), it adopted
the same terms in exempting the "endowment and invested funds" of the institutions; these terms are used in the present statute.
"I N. C. PuB. LAWS 1939, c. 310, §§600(4), 601(2). The legislature in the
past has put very little emphasis on the type of institutions which could claim
tax exemption for property used for religious purposes; it has usually been suffident if the organization was a church or other religious association. For the most
part, however, it has been careful to require that the religious body itself own

the property for which exemption was claimed. In 1869 the legislature did not

limit the exemption to any particular type of religious institution; the property
simply had to be "set apart for and appropriated to the exercise of Divine worship,
or the propagation of the gospel, or used as parsonages". N. C. PuB. LAWs
1868-69, c. 74, §14(2). Apparently, under this first statute both private owners and
churches could claim the exemption, provided the property was devoted to the
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has extended the definition of "literary, scientific, charitable" institutions
to include: in 1870, the Masonic fraternity, Order of Odd Fellows, Good
Templars and Friends of Temperance ;189 in 1872, the Knights of
Pythias ;140 in 1875, the Patrons of Husbandry and asylums ;141 in 1877,
the Independent Order of Mechanics ;14 in 1879, the Knights of Honor,
Good Samaritans, Brothers and Sisters of Love and Charity ;143 in
1881, the Royal Archanum ;144 in 1883, the Hibernian Benevolent Society
of Wilmington ;145 in 1885,. the Israel and Priscilla Tent of Wilmington ;146 in 1897, the Farmers Mutual Fire Insurance Association; 147 in
1905, Y. M. C. A.'s and similar associations, reformatories, hospitals
and nunneries not conducted for profit ;148 in 1923, the "American
Legion or Post of the American Legion" ;149 and in 1929, "any benevolent,
patriotic, historical" associatibn;150 until today it has phrased the exemption in somewhat overlapping language to include: (1) Young
Men's Christian Associations and similar religious associations, orphanages or similar homes, hospitals and nunneries not conducted for
profit,151 (2) the American Legion, any post of the American Legion,
52
or any benevolent, patriotic, historical or charitable association.
I Thus the blanket words "educational, religious, scientific, literary,
charitable" have been extended to cover a multitude of charities and
required uses. But in N. C. PUB. LAWS 1871-72, c. 49, §11(2), the legislature
required the property to be owted by "any religious denomination or society" before the exemption could be claimed. It continued to require the religious body
claiming the exemption to own the property, in N. C. PuB. LAWS 1905, c. 590,
§63(2)-(3), as well as in subsequent years up to date, even though the specific
items of property exempted were enumerated, including land, buildings, furniture
and furnishing. There are some variations from this policy, however. In N. C.
PuB. LAWS 1919, c. 92, §72(3), when the legislature first began to extend exemptions to buildings and lands held for investment purposes, if the income
therefrom was used for religious purposes, it required the religious body to own
and hold such property through gift or will, but two years later it removed this
requirement, it being sufficient if the property was owned by the religious body;
in N. C. Pun. LAWS 1933, c. 204, §304(4-a), and up to the present statute, it
exempted property held for investment purposes if such property either belonged
to or was "held for the benefit" of "churches and religious societies". Since N. C.
Pun. LAWS 1905, c. 590, §63(2)-(3), the legislature has exempted the private
libraries of ministers, apparently whether owned by the religious body or the
minister himself.
"IN. C. PUB. LAws 1869-70, c. 225, §11(2).
IIoN.
C. Pun. LAWs 1871-72, c. 49, §11(2).
"I12N. C. PuB. LAws 1874-75, c. 184, §12(2).
"IN. C. Pun. LAWS 1876-77, c. 155, §12(2).
" IN. C. PuB. LAWS 1879, c. 71, §13(2).
1"' N. C. Pun. LAws 1881, c. 117, §12(2).
"5 N. C. Pun. LAWS 1883, c. 363, §17.
" IN. C. PuB. LAws 1885, c. 177, §16(2).
SIN.

N.
2 0 N.
N.
"I1N.
"I N.

"I

C.
C.
C.
C.
C.
C.

Pun. LAWS
Pun. LAWS
Pun. LAws
PuB. LAWS
Pun. LAWS
Pun. LAWS

1897, c. 169, §20(2).
1905, c. 590, §63 (5).
1923, c. 12, §66(6).
1929, c. 344, §304(6).
1939, c. 310, §§600(5), 601(5).
1939, c. 310, §§600(6), 601(6).
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related things and the expansion still goes on as existing types multiply
their kind and as new types are created and through legislative processes
seek safety from taxation in the shelter of the constitutional arms.
Types of property for which the aforementioned organizationsmay
claim exemption. Under the constitutional authority to exempt "cemeteries", the general assembly has extended the exemption from "graveyards or burial lots" to include real property, tombs, vaults, and
mausoleums set apart for bural purposes, unless owned and held for
rental or sale. 153
It does not call for much stretching of the imagination or straining
of the constitution to conclude that "tombs, vaults, and mausoleums" at
the grave, or on the way to it, fall within the scope of the word "cemeteries", no less than the graveyard itself. At any rate, since 1868 the
court has had no occasion to draw any such distinction. Neither constitution nor statute -distinguishes between publicly owned and privately
owned cemeteries.
Today the general assembly authorizes the aforementioned organizations to claim exemption for the following types of real property: buildings, the lands actually occupied by them, and adjacent lands reasonably
necessary for the building's convenient use belonging to them and by
them used exclusively (1) for educational purposes or for residences by
the officers or instructors of educational institutions,15 4 or (2) for religious purposes or for residences of ministers of churches or religious
bodies,155 or (3) for the purposes of charitable organizations, including
5

' N. C. PuB. LAWS 1939, c. 310, §600(1).

N. C. PuB. LAWS 1939, c. 310, §600(4). From 1868 to 1875 the legislature used only the blanket term "property" in describing the property exempt
when used for educational purposes, apparently exempting real property and
personal property, both tangible and intangible; in N. C. PuB. LAWS 1874-75, c.
184, §12(2), it continued using the term "property" but expressly provided that
the exemption should not apply to "solvent credits"; twelve years later in N. C.
Pun. LAWS 1887, c. 137, §21(2), it again extended the exemption to "solvent
credits", but continued using the term "property" until 1905. In N. C. PUB. LAWS
1905, c. 590, §63(4), it exempted (a) buildings and land actually occupied by
educational institutions, together with additional adjacent land, (b) furniture and
furnishings, (c) books and instruments, and (d) endowment funds; in N. C.
15l

PuB.

LAWS

1933, c. 204, §304(4-a), it extended the exemption to any real prop-

erty, land, buildings or otherwise, where such property was, producing income and
the income was applied to designated purposes. No new types of property have
been added since that time.
"I N. C. PuB. LAWS 1939, c. 310, §600(3). From 1868 to 1874 the legislature
used the term "property" without further qualification, apparently exempting real
property and personal property, both tangible and intangible; in N. C. Pun. LAws
1874-75, c. 184, §11 (2), it continued using the term "property'" but expressly provided that the exemption should not apply to "solvent credits"; twelve years later,
N. C. PuB. LAWS 1887, c. 137, §21(2), it again extended the exemption to "solvent
credits" by removing this prohibition and using the term "property"; in N. C. Pun.
LAws 1901, c. 7, §60(4), it exempted "real property" and "personal property"; in
N. C. PuB. LAWS 1905, c. 590, §63(2)-(3), it narrowed the exemption provision,
no longer using the blanket terms "real" and "personal" property, but providing
expressly for the exemption of (1) buildings, (2) with the land they actually
occupy, (3) together with the land adjacent thereto, (4) furniture and furnishings
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Y. M. C. A.'s and similar religious associations, orphanages and similar
homes, hospitals and nunneries, not conducted for profit but entirely
and completely as charitable, 156 or (4) for lodge purposes of the
American Legion or any benevolent, patriotic, historical or charitable
157
association.
"What is meant by adjacent land?" asked Justice Winborn in First
Baptist Church v. Guilford County,158 and took his answer from Webster: "objects are adjacent when they lie close to each other, but not
necessarily in actual contact. . . ." Applying this answer he held that a
vacant lot five city blocks away from the church was "adjacent" land
and therefore exempt from taxation when reasonably necessary for the
convenient use of the church building. One may inquire whether the
dictionary meaning is necessarily the legislative meaning. However,
there appears to be no legislative definition of the word. Nor is there
any judicial interpretation of the North Carolina statute inconsistent
with Webster. An early North Carolina case raising a similar problem
involved a different statute. In Stewart v. Davis, 59 the legislature
exempted "all houses and lots or other real or personal estate appertaining thereto, set apart and appropriated to divine worship, or for the
of -buildings, and (5) private libraries of ministers; in N. C. Pun.

LAWS

1923, c.

12, §66(4), it added the above list (6) "endowment and invested funds"; no new
types of property have been added since that time.

...
N. C. PUB. LAtvs 1939, c. 310, §600(5). From 1868 to 1875 the legislature
used only the blanket term "property" in describing the property exempt When
owned by charitable institutions, apparently exempting real and personal property,
both tangible and intangible; in N. C. PUB. LAWS 1874-75, c. 184, §12(2), it continued using the term "property" but expressly provided that the exemption should
not apply to "solvent credits"; twelve years later, in N. C. Pun. LAws 1887, c.
137, §21(2), it struck out the exception as to "solvent credits" but continued using
the term "property" until 1901; in N. C. PUB. LAWS 1901, c. 7, §60(4), it exempted "real property" and "personal property". In N. C. PUB. LAWS 1905,
c. 390, §63(5), the legislature became more specific and exempted (1) "real
estate", (2) "personal property", including "endowment funds", which became
"endowment and invested funds" in 1923. These types of property are continued
in the present statute.
57 N. C. PUB. LAws 1939, c. 310, §600(6). From 186 to 1875 the legislature
used only the blanket term "property" in describing the property exempt when
owned by benevolent institutions and used for benevolent and charitable purposes,
exempting real and personal property, both tangible and intangible; in N. C. PUB.
LAWs 1874--75, c. 184, §12(2), it continued using the term "property" but expressly
provided that the exemption should not apply to "solvent credits"; twelve years
later, in N. C. Pun. LAws 1887, c. 137, §21(2), itstruck out the exception as
to "solvent credits", but continued using the term "property" until 1901; in N. C.
PUB.LAWS 1901, c. 7, §60(4), it exempted "real property" and "personal -roperty".
In N. C. PUB. LAws 1905, c. 590, §63(5)-(6), the legislature became more specific
and exempted (1) buildings, (2) lands, (3) profits arising from rents, leases or
rooms in buildings, (4) furniture and furnishings of buildings and (5) other property; in N. C. PuB. LAws 1923, c. 12, §66(4), it added "endowment and invested
funds"; in 1937 it struck out the provision relating to profits arising from rents,
leases and rooms, but apparently left other terms broad enough to include this
type of property. The other types enumerated have remained in the act through
the present statute.
1-8218 N. C. 718 (1940).
17
N. C. 244, 245 (1819).
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education of youth". The Newbern Academy claimed exemption on a
lot not adjoining the academy, and the court denied the exemption,
saying: "It was the design of this law to exempt from taxes only that
property ... exclusively set apart and appropriated to divine worship
or education, and directly employed for either of these purposes; as the
lot on which a church stands, which would include the church yard and
the minister's residence, if the latter be an appurtenance to the principal
lot; or an Academy and the lot on which it is built, and the grounds
appurtenant to it, if employed in the purposes of education, as for the
residences of the teachers, or towards the recreation or nourishment of
the youth. . . . Whatever would pass under the name of an appurtenance, comes within the fair scope of its exemption. But a corporation
may own ...real property, which is rented out for sums more than
sufficient to meet any demands arising from the objects of their incorporation; and if the Legislature intended to exemp all the property...
from taxation, they would probably have used words of larger compass
than those contained in this law."
What is meant by "reasonably necessary for the convenient use" of
the building in question? In United Brethren v. Commissioners,60 the
court held that the statute exempting "property belonging to and set
apart and exclusively used for" (various charitable agencies), exempted
the church, the land on which it stood and the surrounding two acres
(conceded to be reasonably necessary for its convenient use) and taxed
the remaining eighteen acres in the plot and other lots not adjacent
thereto. In 1940161 the court held that a vacant six acre lot "used only
by Sunday school classes and organization of the church as place for
holding outdoor meetings", was reasonably necessary for the convenient
use of a church five blocks away and too small to house all church
activities.
What is meant by "belonging to"? It is not always necessary that
the organization claiming exemption should hold the technical legal
title.1 62 "We are not inadvertent to the fact," said Justice Hoke in Corporation Commission v. Oxford Seminary Construction Co., 16 3 "that
the legal title to this property is in the corporation, and that the same
"0115 N. C. 489, 20 S. E. 626 (1894).
"'1Piedmont Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Guilford County, 218 N. C. 673 (1940).
...
But throughout the history of the exemptions of property used for educational, scientific, literary, charitable and benevolent, or religious purposes, from
1868 through the present statute, the Legislature has consistently required the property to belong to the institution claiming the exemption. One exception to this
policy exists in the case of real property producing income when the income is
applied to religious, charitable, educational or benevolent purposes; in N. C. Pun.
LAWS 1933, c. 204, §304(4-a), the legislature provided that such property could
be either "held for the benefit of" or "beneficially belong to" the institution and
still163be160
taxN.exempt;
continued
through the present statute.
C. 582, this
590, has
76 S.been
E. 640,
644 (1912).
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has been rented to F. P. Hobgood, who conducts and controls the school,
and we are in full accord with the well-considered decisions which hold
that the words 'used exclusively for school purposes' or 'wholly devoted
to educational purposes' do not ordinarily apply to the case where an
owner builds a schoolhouse and rents it to another for purposes of a
school.... But looking through the form to the substance, it appears
that for fifty years and more this school has been successfully conducted
by F. P. Hobgood and his predecessors ....and it having become necessary to renew and enlarge the school buildings, resort was had to the
form of incorporation in which F. P. Hobgood took 264 of the 543
shares and his friends and fellow citizens the remainder in small amounts,
this being done by them in recognition of his worth and of the great
benefit that such a, school had been and promised to be to this community. The funds available not being sufficient, the corporation, in
order to complete the buildings exclusively devoted to school purposes,
borrowed $10,000, secured by deed of trust on the property and the
entire investment is turned over to the management and control of said
F. P. Hobgood, to be used exclusively for school purposes, at a nominal
rental of $250, for the purpose of creating a sinking fund with which
to discharge the principal of the money borrowed. The other incorporators have thus far neither received nor asked anything for their
own benefit, and assuredly until the debt is paid and some return is
received or demanded from this property regarded as an investment, we
are of opinion that the ownership and control and management should
be considered as one and the same, and that this property comes within
the exemption established by the statute, the same being at present entirely dedicated to educational purposes."
What is meant by "used exclusively" for the above mentioned purposes? This requirement of "exclusive" use for the approved purpose
has been included in one form of words or another in exemption provisions since 1868.164 At times the general assembly has re-emphasized
...
Religious: In N. C. PuB. LAWS 1868-69, c. 74, §14(2), the legislature required property to be (a) "especially set apart for and appropriated to the exercise
of Divine Worship, or (b) the propagation of the Gospel, or (c)used as parsonages" before i-'
could be exempt; in N. C. PuD. LAws 1887, c. 137, §21(2), it

added. the requirement that such property be used exclusively for religious,

charitable or educational purposes, and in N. C. PuB. LAWS 1889, c. 218, §23(2),
that it be not held for rent or for the purpose of "speculating in the sale thereof".
In N. C. PuB. LAWS 1893, c. 296, §20(2), it became more liberal by exempting
property held for rent when the rental was applied exclusively to the support of
the Gospel. In N. C. Pu. LAws 1901, c. 7, §60(4), the legislature became more
specific and exempted only when the property owned by religious bodies was used
as follows: (a) Personal property was exempt if "used exclusively for the purposes of . . . (the religious) association; (b) the provision exempting property
held for rent when the rental was applied exclusively to the support of the Gospel
was removed, and "real property" was exempt only if not leased or otherwise
used for pecuniary profit and if necessary for the location and convenience of the
buildings of the religious association. The occasional leasing of the buildings
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this requirement by specifically excluding from the exemption any
for schools, public lectures or concerts, however, did not render them taxable, and
parsonages were exempted whether occupied by the pastor or rented for his benefit.
In N. C. Pun. LAWS 1903, c. 251, §63(4), it extended exemption to real property
held for rent if the rents were used exclusively for (a) charitable or benevolent
purposes, or (b) to pay the interest upon the bonded indebtednss of the association.
In N. C. Pun. LAws 1905, c. 590, §63(2)-(3), the legislature became more

specific still and exempted only if the property was used as follows: (a) Build-

ings with the land they actually occupy, together with the additional adjacent land
reasonably necessary for the convenient use of the buildings, if used exclusively
for religious worship or, for the residence of the minister. The occasional leasing

of the buildings did not render them liable to taxation but buildings and land held

for rent were not exempt; (b) the furniture and furnishings of such buildings
if used exclusively for religious worship or the residence of the minister; and
(c)the private library of the minister. Fourteen years later, in N. C. PuB. LAWS
1919, c. 92, §72(3), it again extended exceptions to buildings and the land upon
which they were located when the income was used exclusively for religious,
charitable or benevolent purposes; in N. C. Pun. LAWS 1929, c. 344, §304(3), this
exemption was extended to any land producing income whether buildings were
located thereon or not; and, in N. C. Pun. LAWS 1933, c. 204, §304(4-a), it was
extended to any real property belonging to religious societies where the rent, interest or income was either (a) used exclusively for religious, charitable, educational or benevolent purposes, or (b) to pay the interest upon the bonded indebtedness of the religious institution-this has continued on through the present statute.
In N. C. Pun. LAWS 1923, c. 12, §66(4), the legislature also extended exemption
to the endowment and invested funds of religious associations when the income
from the funds was used wholly and exclusively for religious, charitable, educational or benevolent purposes. In N. C. PuB. LAws 1937, c. 291, §601(5), this
exemption was extended to such funds if the income also was used to pay the
principal or interest of the indebtedness of the institution-these provisions have
been continued in the present statute.
Educational: From 1868 to 1885 the legislature required property to be "set
apart and exclusively used" for the University, colleges and other schools before
it was exempt; in N. C. Pun. LAWS 1887, c. 137, §21 (2), it added the requirement that the property be "used exclusively for religious, charitable or educational
purposes"; and in N. C. PuB. LAWS 1889, c. 218, §23(2), it added the further
requirement that the property be "not held for the purpose of speculating in the
sale thereof or for rent"' and in 1893, "or for investment". In N. C. Pun. LAWS
1901, c. 7, §60(2), the legislature dropped out all of the above provisos and
simply provided that the property be set apart and exclusively used for the University, colleges and institutions of learning; in N. C. PuB. LAWS 1901, c. 7,
§60(4), the legislature, for the first time extended exemption to public library
associations, exempting both the real and personal property and the endowment
funds either if such property was actually used, or the income of the property if
invested was used, for library purposes; in 1905, however, though it continued to
extend exemptions to libraries, it exempted only if actually used for library purposes, and not if invested or rented, as noted below. In N. C. Pun. LAWS 1905.
c. 590, §63(4), it became more specific and exempted property of educational
institutions only when used as follows: (a) Buildings with the land they actually
occupy, together with such additional adjacent land of such institution as was
reasonably necessary for the convenient use of the buildings, if exclusively occupied and used by the educational institution, and wholly devoted to educational
purposes; (b) the "buildings thereon used as residences by the officers or instructors of such educational institutions"; (c) the furniture and furnishings, books
and instruments contained in such buildings and wholly devoted to educational
purposes and exclusively used by the educational institution. In N. C. PuB. LAWS
1917, c. 234, §72(2), it also extended the exception to private libraries of the
teachers in public schools; in N. C. PuB. LAWS 1923, c. 12, §66(4), it extended
the exemption to the "endowment and invested funds" of educational, historical
and literary institutions if the income or interest should be used (1) exclusively
for "religious, charitable, educational or benevolent purposes", or (2) as added
in N. C. Pun. LAWS 1937, c. 291, §60(5), to pay the principal or interest of the
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property held for investment, speculation, or rent."'0
The court has
interpreted this -requirement with equal strictness. In United Brethren
v. Commissioners'0l the court applied it- as follows: "The second piece
of property is a parcel of land of about twenty acres in the town of
Winston, known as 'The Reservation'. On the north side is a church,
covering about one-third of an acre, situated on a lot fenced in of about
two acres. Excluding these two acres, the reservation is found to be
worth $18,000. A number of lots have heretofore been sold off, leaving
the tract of the present dimensions, and public notice has been given
that lots were for sale. A part of it is now under lease. This property
(leaving out the church enclosure) is certainly not in use for educational, charitable or religious purposes, and was properly held liable to
taxation. (3) A tract of eighty acres in West Salem, chiefly in forest,
and worth $5,000. A schoolhouse stands on the eastern side. It is
found as a fact that only about two acres were necessary for the use
of the school. It was properly held that the remainder of the tract was
liable to taxation. It would be advantageous, no. doubt, to the corporation to hold the unused seventy-eight acres as an investment, and reap
the benefit of the increased value which will come to real estate adjacent
indebtedness of such association. In N. C. PUB. LAWS 1933, c. 204, §304(4-a),
the legislature extended the exemption to exempt any "property" of "educational"
historical and literary" institutions, -producing income if such rent, interest or
income shall be used (1) exclusively for religious, charitable, educational or
benevolent purposes, or (2) to pay the interest upon the bonded indebtedness of
the institution. These provisions have been continued through the present statute.
Charitable and Benevolent: In N. C. Pus. LAWS 1868-69, c. 74, §14(2), the
legislature required the property to be "set apart and exclusivly used" for the
particular institutions named; and, in N. C. Pus. LAws 1887, c. 135, §21(2),
added that the property be "used exclusively for . . .charitable . . .purposes";
and in N. C. PuB. LAWS 1889, c. 218, §23(2), added that the property be not
"held for the purpose of speculating in the sale thereof or for rent'. In N. C.
PUB. LAWS 1901, c. 7, §60(4), it exempted (1) "personal property" used exclusively for the purposes of -the association, (2) "real property", if not leased
or used for pecuniary profit, necessary for the location and convenience of the
buildings, and (3) parsonages occupied by the pastor or rented for his benefit; in
N. C. PUB. LAWS 1903, c. 251, §63(4), exemption was also extended to real
property when the rents therefrom shall be used exclusively for charitable or
benevolent purposes or to pay the interest upon the bonded indebtedness; this last
exemption was dropped out in 1905. In N. C. PUB. LAws 1905, c. 590, §63, the
legislature extended exemption to rents and profits arising from rental of the
lodge and other buildings -when such income was used exclusively for charitable
and benevolent purposes; this specific provision disappeared in 1937, but this type
of income and property seems to be covered by N. C. PUB. LAWS 1933, c. 204,
§304(4-a) exempting "property" producing income when the income is used for
charitable and benevolent purposes or to pay the interest on the bonded indebtedness. In N. C. PuB. LAWS 1923, c. 12, §66(4), it extended exemption to the
"endowment and invested funds" of charitable and benevolent institutions when
the income from such funds were used for . . . charitable . . . or benevolent
purposes, and in N. C. PUB. LAWs 1937, c. 291, §601(5), to pay the principal or
interest of the institution's indebtedness. These provisions have been maintained
in the present statute.
" N. C. PUB. LAWs 1868-69, c. 74, §3; N. C. PuB. LAws 2. 218, §23(2);

N. C. PUB.
"o

LAws

1893, c. 296, §20(2).

115 N. C. 489, 496, 20 S. E. 626, 627 (1894).
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to a growing and prosperous town like Winston; but in the meantime
such property must bear its share of the public burdens. The exemption
is for property now used for religious, charitable or educational purposes, and not for property abstracted from all use or used to create a
large fund in future, which fund when so created may be used for such
purposes."
If the entire building is used exclusively for the approved purpose,
it is obviously exempt. But suppose all floors but one are so used? or a
bare majority of floors? or only one floor? If the building is taken as
the unit, then the property is not used "exclusively" for the approved
purpose. If the floor is taken as the unit, then the floors so used may
be exempt. And suppose one room or a suite of rooms is so used?
Educational institutions operated for a profit. Neither constitution
nor statute draws a distinction between educational institutions operated
for a profit and those not operated for a profit. In either case it is held
for "educational purposes". "We find nothing in the constitution or
statute which distinguishes between public and private undertakings or
between institutions which are in part conducted for the personal profit
of the owner and proprietor and those which are run on a salary basis,
using any profits which may arise in the extension* of the work", said
Justice Hoke in Corporation Commissioners z. Oxford Seminary Construction Co.16 7 ". . . We may not approve the position that the
exemption cannot be extended to cases where, as in this case, an incorporated college has for one of its objects the personal profit of the
president and owner."
Hospitals operated for a profit. Both constitution and statutes draw
a distinction between hospitals operated for a profit and those operated
for charitable purposes; for a hospital may claim exemption for its
property only when it is held for "charitable purposes", and a hospital
operated for profit is not operated for charity, as the court points out in
Salisbury Hospital v. Rowan County :168 "The plaintiff is not a charitable
association nor was its property used by it entirely for charitable purposes". This is true even though the hospital in fact makes no profit.
Nor does the fact that it does some charity work bring it within the
exempted class.
Following this decision the general assembly gave private hospitals
doing charity work a measure of relief by providing:169 "Private hospitals shall not be exempt from property taxes... , but in consideration
of the large amount of charity work done by them, . . . commissioners
.. . are authorized and directed to accept as valid claims against the
160 N. C. 58Z, 589, 76 S. E. 640, 643 (1912).
168205 N. C. 8, 169 S. E. 805 (1933).
69 N. C. PuB. LAWS 1933, c. 204, §304(5-A).
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county, the bills of such hospitals for . . . services voluntarily rendered
to afflicted or injured residents of the county who are indigent and likely
to become public charges.. . and the same shall be allowed as payments
on ... all taxes which may become due ... on properties strictly used
for hospital purposes, but to that extent only will the county be liable
for such hospital bills." The privilege was granted also as to municipal
property taxes.
Thereafter the case of Piednwnt Memorial Hospital v. Guilford
County came before the court. 0 According to the agreed statement
of facts "the plaintiff is a non-profit benevolent and charitable corporation, created . .. to conduct without profit, and entirely and completely
for charitable and humane purposes, a general.hospital. . . ". The plaintiff, therefore, claimed exemption as a charitable organization holding
its property for charitable purposes. The court, however, held that the
above statute "deals specifically with private hospitals, and was apparently intended to embody the only provision relating to that particular
class of property, and to afford a means of repayment for charitable
services rendered the county's indigent sufferers, without exempting
the property from taxation". Though "it appears that the plaintiff is a
'non-profit, benevolent and charitable corporation' . . . its seems clear
that, as contradistinguished from a public hospital, in the sense of one
supported, maintained and controlled by public authority, the plaintiff
maintains a private corporation controlled by a self perpetuating board
of trustees named by the corporation." It appears, therefore, that if
the above statute had not been passed, or if it should be repealed, and
with it "the legislative intent ... to fix a separate and distinct classification for private hospitals", or if the general assembly should lisclaim
such "legislative intent", the plaintiff might qualify as' a charitable
organization and claim exemption for property held "entirely and completely" for charitable purposes. In determining whether such property
is held "entirely and completely" for charitable purposes, the court is
willing to divide the building into floors and take the floors as independent units rather than the building as a whole.
Today the legislature also authorizes the aforementioned organizations to claim exemption for the following types of personal property:
(1) Furniture and furnishings, books and instruments belonging to and
used exclusively by educational institutions and contained in buildings
wholly devoted to educational purposes, and private libraries of teachers
in the public schools ;171 (2) furniture and furnishings, books and instruments belonging to and used exclusively by churches or religious bodies
for religious worship or for the residences of ministers, and private
170 218 N. C. 673 (1940).
"IN. C. PUB. LAWS 1939, c. 310, §601(3).
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libraries of ministers ;172 (3) personal property belonging to Y. M. C. A.'s
and the like, orphanages and the like, reformatories, hospitals and nunneries not conducted for profit, and used exclusively for charitable and
benevolent purposes;173 (4) furniture, furnishings and other personal
property belonging to the American Legion, or any patriotic, historical,
benevolent or charitable association, used by them exclusively for lodge
1 4
purposes and meeting rooms or for benevolent and charitable purposes. 7
If this statute is taken at its face value, the scope of the personal
property exemption is not the same for all organizations concerned. It
includes the "furniture, furnishings, books and instruments" of one
group, the "furniture, furnishings and other personal property" of another, and the "personal property" of another. The court has not yet
been called upon to say whether these verbal distinctions make a legal
difference. There is a specific requirement that the personal property
of educational institutions be contained in buildings wholly devoted to
educational purposes in order to be exempt; but there is no such specific
requirement as to other agencies, though in some instances it may be
read in by implication. The private libraries of ministers and teachers
in the public schools are exempt, but not the private libraries of officers
of the other agencies.
The general assembly has gone further and exempted property
beneficially belonging to or held for the benefit of, and the endowment and
invested funds of, "churches, religious societies, charitable, educational,
literary, benevolent, patriotic or historical institutions or orders," when
the rent, interest or income from such investment is used exclusively (1)
for religious, charitable, educational or benevolent purposes, or (2) to
pay the principal or interest of the indebtedness of said institutions or
1 75
orders.
When the general assembly exempted property of designated organizations used exclusively for constitutionally approved purposes, it was
clearly within the bounds of the constitution. Was it still within these
bounds when (1) it exempted such property when rented out for business uses with the income used for the approved purposes? And when
(2) it went still further and exempted such property where neither the
property itself nor the income therefrom is used for the approved purposes, but rather to pay the principal and interest on the indebtedness
on such property, on the theory that the income will be used for the
approved purposes as soon as the debt is paid? Is such property held
for "educational, religious, scientific, literary or charitable purposes ?"
For fifty years or more the general assembly has thought it could
"'IN.C. PUB. LAWS 1939, c. 310, §601(2).
"IN. C. Pui. LAws 1939, c. 310, §601(5).
"'N. C. Puo. LAWs 1939, c. 310, §601(6).
"' N. C. Pu. LAWS 1939, c. 310, §600(7).
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exempt such property. In 1893170 it exempted property rented out by
churches or religious bodies when the rental was "applied exclusively to
the support of the gospel"; in 1903'
it exempted real property of'
charitable and benevolent institutions if the rents were used exclusively
for charitable or benevolent purposes or to pay the interest upon the
bonded indebtedness of the institution; in 1905,178 it repealed the exemption when the income was used to pay interest but continued the
other exemption; in 1919,179 it extended this exemption to religious
institutions; in 1923180 it exempted the endowment funds of religious,
charitable, educational, literary, benevolent or historical institutions,
when the income from such funds was used exclusively for religious,
charitable, educational or benevolent purposes; and in 1933,181 it extended the exemption to "property" of such institutions where the rent
should be used exclusively for religious, charitable, educational or benevolent purposes, or to'pay the principal or interest of the indebtedness of
the institutions claiming exemption. These provisions have been brought
18 2
forward in the present statute.
The court thought the general assembly could exempt such property
as early as 1894 when it said:183 "It was, and is, competent for the
Legislature to also exempt property whose rental is applied to educational or charitable purposes.... That matter rests in the Legislature's
discretion". Forty-six years later, in the year 1940, it appears that the
Justice uttering this dictum may have outrun his own headlights. In
Odd Fellows v. Swain, 8 4 the plaintiff owned an office building in Raleigh,
had lodge rooms on part of the tenth floor and rented the remainder of
the building for commercial use as offices and stores; all income was
expended for repairs, remodeling and payment on a mortgage indebtedness in excess of $300,000, and none for charitable purposes. Wake
County levied a tax on this property. The plaintiff claimed exemption
as a charitable organization under the revenue acts in force, on the
ground that "the rent, interest or income from its investment was used
exclusively to pay the interest on its bonded indebtedness". The court
refused to allow the exemption on the theory that property held for
rent under those circumstances is not held for a charitable purpose, and
therefore cannot be exempt under the constitution. It is to be noted in
this case, however, that the Lodge had "at no time made any payments,
IN. C. PUB. LAws 1893, c. 296, §20(2).
1'N
. C. PuB. LAWS 1903, c. 251, §63 (4).
178 N.
C. PUB. LAws 1905, c. 590, §63.
"7IN.
C.
1919, c.
§72(3).
I8
C. Ptm.
PUB. LAWS
LAWs 1923,
c. 92,
12, §66(4).
1N.
"I
N.
C.
PuB.
LAWS
1933,
c.
204,
§304(4-a).
8I N. C. PuB. LAWS 1939, c. 310, §§600,
601.
8
. United Brethren v. Commissioners, 115 N. C. 489, 495, 20 S. E. 626, 627
(1894).
" 217 N. C. 632, 9 S.E. (2d) 365 (1940).
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donations or contributions to any charitable purpose from the operation
of its building", 8 5 and that the payments on the principal and interest
of its indebtedness were likely to absorb the rents and profits for some
time and leave little or nothing for charitable purposes for years to
come. "The statute", says the court, "has reference to a charity in fact
as distinguished from one in theory or promise."18 6
But the reasoning of the court goes far beyond the facts of the Odd
Fellows case and, if followed to its logical conclusion would deny exemption to property rented out under similar circumstances even if the
income is applied to charitable purposes. "Property held for any of
these purposes [educational, scientific, literary, charitable or religious]",
said the Chief Justice,' 87 "is supposed to be withdrawn from the competitive field of commercial activity, and hence it was not thought a
violation of the rule of equality or uniformity, to permit its exemption
from taxation while occupying this favored position. But when it is
thrust into the business life of the community, it loses its sheltered
place, regardless of the character of the owner, for it is then held for
profit or gain. . . . Conceding that the General Assembly may have
placed a broader interpretation under Art. V, Sec. 5, of the Constitution
than is warranted by its language, induced no doubt by dicta contained
in some of our decisions, it does not follow that the pervading principle
of the Constitution, which is equality, should ergo be abandoned, or that
the discretionary power of exemption, contained therein, should be extended to property held and used for purposes other than those specifically mentioned. The grant is limited in its terms, and the power to
exempt stops at the boundary of the grant."
A few months later, in Piedmont Memorial Hospital v. Guilford
County,. 8 8 the first and second floors of a building, rented out by the
plaintiff charitable organization for "commercial and business purposes", produced an income which was in part used for annual payments
on its debt and in part for charitable purposes presumably within the
meaning of the constitution but not within the meaning of the particular
statute. "As to that portion of the building, on the first and second
floors, which is rented out for commercial and business purposes, the
rule laid down by this Court in Odd Fellows v. Swain must be held
applicable, and determinative of the question of exemption against the
plaintiff. . . . Anything in Chapter 310, Public Laws, 1939, which
attempts to exempt this portion of the building from taxation must be
held in excess of the granted power of the General Assembly."
Thus, the court has held that the general assembly may not exempt
property when the income is used solely for annual payments on out2S7

ld. at 635, 9 S.E. (2d) at 267.
i85
Ibid.

8
"
9 S. (1940).
E. (2d) at 368.
N.637,
C. 673
188 Id.
218 at
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standing indebtedness as in the Odd Fellows case ;189 nor when the income is used in part for payment on debts and in part for charitable
purposes, as in the Piedmont Memorial Hospital case.'9 0 The reasoning of the court in both cases apparently goes further than the facts in
either case and indicates that property rented out for business purposes
is not held for "educational, religious, scientific, literary or charitable
purposes" even if the income is used exclusively for such purposes.
Cases are now on the way to the court to test the full implications of
these decisions.
In the meantime the court's reasoning in the Odd Fellows case and
in the Piedmont Hospital case finds supporting analysis in the decisions
dealing with the exemption of property belonging to municipal corporations. The constitution specifically exempts such property and the
general assembly and court read into this exemption provision the
limitation that the property must be held for public purposes. In support of this limitation the court has cited the succeeding sentence of the
constitution authorizing the general assembly to exempt property held
for charitable purposes and argued that if property belonging to charitable, etc., corporations may be exempt only if held for charitable, etc.,
purposes, property belonging to municipal corporations may be exempt
only if held for public purposes and that this is the plain intent and
meaning of the constitution.
The validity of this reasoning is open to question. There is considerable force in the dissenting opinion that the constitution makers looked
on these classes of property differently, because: (1) they put the exemptions in separate sentences, (2) they required the general assembly
to exempt the one to its full amount and permitted it to exempt the
other in whole, in part, or not at all, (3) they made ownership by the
municipal corporation the test of exemption in the one and the purpose
for which it was held the test of exemption in the other. Under the
terms of the constitution the general assembly apparently may exempt
property held by business organizations for charitable, etc., purposes.
The fact that since 1868 it has chosen to exempt such property only
when belonging to charitable organizations, and since 1885 has added
a provision limiting the exemption of municipally owned property to
cases where it is held for a public purpose, is certainly evidence that
the general assembly intends to put both types on the same basis, or
even that it believes the constitution puts them on the same basis, but
it is not necessarily proof that the constitution makers so intended.19 0
280 217 N. C. 632, 9 S. E. (2d) 365 (1940).
100218 N. C.673 (1940).
...
a Justice Seawell further questions the validity of the court's assumption that
the constitution makers intended that municipal corporations adhere strictly to
governmental functions in the strict sense: "Article VII, section 7, of the Con-

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19

But grant the major premise of the court that the general assembly
has given expression to the intent and purpose of the constitution to
put municipal corporations, charitable, etc., organizations on the same
basis for tax exemption purposes, and starting with the court's decisions
that property belonging to municipal corporations is not held for a
public purpose when rented out for business purposes even if the income is applied to public purposes, does it not follow that property belonging to charitable, etc., organizations is not "held for educational, scientific,
literary, charitable, or religious purposes", when it is rented out for
business purposes, even if the income is applied to the constitutionally
approved purposes? And does it not follow that such property thus
rented out is even farther removed from the constitutionally approved
purposes when the income is applied to the payment of principal or interest on the indebtedness thereof ?
Will the court go still further and hold that solvent credits of charitable, etc., organizations are not exempt when the income therefrom
is applied exclusively to charitable purposes? At this point it may or
may not accept the 'distinction drawn by Justice Clark nearly fifty years
ago in construing a statute exempting property "set apart and used" for
approved purposes. Solvent credits, he said,19 x were "set apart and
used" for charitable purposes, and therefore exempt from taxation when
the interest on them was applied exclusively to charitable purposes: "It
seems to us that the corpus of the fund is 'set apart and used exclusively'
for such purposes. It is the only mode in which it can be so set apart
and used, and it is therefore exempt until the Legislature shall declare
its will to tax it. This fund is not held for investment in the meaning
of the proviso [not exempting when property held for speculation, investment,, or for rent], for that contemplates the holding of the property
for the benefit of the corporation, to await enhancement or future use,
stitution clearly recognizes that municipalities may carry on activities unessential
to government and that proprietary ownership of facilities for That purpose may
legitimately take place... . At the time of the adoption of the Constitution of
1868 and its reconsideration in 1875, proprietary ownership of property by towns
and cities had -been common in North Carolina for at least one hundred years,
during which time, as far as I am able to discover, no tax had been levied on it
by the State or any other agencies. The constitutional provision was but the
reiteration of a State policy that had been in force since colonial days. ... The
Convention of 1868 rejected a-minority report that would have taxed municipal
property and adopted a majority report which exempted it.... The Convention
With this knowledge
of 1875 discussed this clause and declined to amend it ...
that proprietary ownership of property was well nigh universal in all the cities
of the State of any importance, this provision was adopted by one Convention
and considered and left intact by another without qualification or clarification."
Warrenton v. Warren County, 215 N. C. 342, 363, 2 S. E. (2d) 463, 467 (1939).
"9 United Brethren v. Commissioners, 115 N. C. 489, 495, 20 S. E. 626, 627
(1894) (italics supplied).
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but here the whole use-the interest-is applied as received, for the
purposes named. Any part of such fund on which the inWerest is not so
applied, but is allowed to accumulate, would not be exempt."
In-support of this view counsel in a case now pending in the court
observes :191, "Endowment funds are surely for educational purposes.
Their creation, the Constitution would encourage. We ask appellants
where they shall be invested-in bonds or stocks, for developments elsewhere, or in mortgages for developments at home? And by process of
law, such funds will at times necessarily acquire real estate. And is
real estate to partake of a peculiar quality as the only kind of property
which cannot be exempted ?"
Since Justice Clark's opinion was written the general assembly has
undertaken specifically to exempt not only property so "set apart and
192
And
used", but also property the income from which is so applied.
though the legislative expression and purpose is different, the constitutional problem is the same. It is just as true now as then that there
is no other way of "using" solvent credits for charitable purposes than
to produce income for charitable purposes. But it is also true that afi
organization or institution thus lending money at interest is in the
"competitive field of commercial activity" in common understanding,
though it may not turn out to be within the scope of this term as used
by the court.
The general assembly has gone still further and extended the foregoing exemptions to apply to real and personal property of foreign
religious, charitable, educational, literary, benevolent, patriotic or historical corporations, institutions or orders, when the property or the
income therefrom is used exclusively for religious, charitable, educational
or benevolent purposes within this state.' 93 This enactment abolished
the former provision construed by the court in Catholic Society v.
Gentry1 94 as withholding the exemption from foreign charitable organizations. Even this new enactment, according to the Attorney General's
ruling, 95 withholds the exemption altogether if any part of the income
from property in this state is used outside the state.
"oaTrustees of Guilford College v. Guilford County, Plaintiff Appellee's Brief,
(1940),2 No. 680, p. 10.
"I N. C. Ptm. LAws 1939, c. 310, §§600(7), 601(4).
I'lN. C. PuB. LAWS 1939, c. 310, §§600(8), 601(7).
194210 N. C. 579, 187 S. E. 795 (1936).
"I'M. C. Attorney General's Ruling in Popular Governtment, October, 1939,
where the Attorney General advised that property held in trust, the income from
which is used for the benefit of ten religious corporations, but only nine-tenths
of such income is used within -this state, one-tenth being used for a foreign
religious corporation, would not be exempt from taxation either in whole or in
part, under the 1939 Machifiery Act.
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CLASS II

Property the General Assembly May Exempt Up to $300
"Wearing apparel, arms for muster, household and kitchen furniture,
the mechanical and agriculturalimplements of mechanics dnd farmers,
libraries, scientific instruments, or any other personal property, to a
value not exceeding three hundred dollars." 9 6
In the years before 1868 most of these items of personal property
had been occasionally taxed and occasionally exempt. Since 1868 the
amount of the exemption has varied: from $200 in 1869,107 to $300 in
1870,198 to $200 in 1871,199 to $100 in 1873,2 00 to $25 in 1875,201 and

back to $300 in 1921.202 The items exempted have also varied, including
from time to time such things as cotton, tobacco, turpentine, rosin, tar,
brandy, whisky, musical instruments, goods, wares, merchandise, plated
and silver ware, and watches and jewelry, 20 3 until today they include:
"Wearing apparel, household and kitchen furniture, mechanical and
agriculturalimplements of farmers and mechanics, librariesand scientific
instruments, provisions and live stock, up to a value of $300"; and also
20 4
all growing crops.

All of the types of property enumerated in the constitution are also
enumerated in the statute, except "all growing crops" and "provisions
and livestock" which may be included under "any other personal property". Around the middle of the last century the general assembly
exempted property set apart and used by agricultural societies for agricultural fairs. 20 5 In 1901 it added "growing crops

' 20 0

to the enumera-

tion, and in 1931 extended this exemption to "all" growing crops,
apparently without limit in amount. Such exemption without limitation
as to amount .appears to exceed constitutional sanction.
CLASS III

Property Which the General Assembly May Exempt to $1000
A 1936 amendment to the constitution authorized the general assembly to exempt property held by the owner as a place of residence up to
$1000 in value. 20 7 Thus far there has been no exercise of this authority.
N. C. CoNsT. (1936) art. V,§5. (Italics supplied.)
, N. C. PuB. LAWS 1868-69, c. 74, §5.
"I N. C. PUB. LAWS 1869-70, c. 225, §11(5).
"I'N. C. PUB. LAWS 1870-71, c. 195, §11(5).
2
'N. C.
LAws 1872-73, c. 115, §11(5).
C. PUB.
Pun. LAws 1874-75, c. 184, §12(5).
N. C. PuB. LAWS 1921, c. 38, §72(6).
198

20IN.
202

20.

See notes 197-202, supra.

N. C. PuB. LAws 1939, c. 310, §601(8). See also N. C. PuB. LAws 1939,
c. 301, §602(b).
21 N. C. PuB. LAWS 1868-69, c. 74, §4. This exemption continued for ten
204

years but was dropped in 1879.
2 N. C. PUB. LAws 1901, c. 7, §60(6); N. C.
0

§306(8).

PUB. LAWS 1931, c. 428,
1 N. C. CONST. (1936), art. V, §5.
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E. MISCELLANEOUS EXEMPTIONS

The statutes also provide for other exemptions not specifically mentioned in the constitution: property belonging to the United States ;208
real property of Indians who are not citizens, except lands they hold by
purchase ;209 tangible personal property held at any seaport destined for
and awaiting foreign shipment ;210 state and local bonds, and real property appropriated exclusively for public parks and -drives, under C. S.
1123.211 The Federal Constitution gives rise to other exemption problems, such as exemption of federal bonds and interest therefrom, and
property in transit in interstate commerce. Lack of space here necessitates their consideration in a subsequent note.
Prospect and Retrospect
The 1936 constitutional amendment struck out the 1868 requirement
in Article V, Section 3, providing: "Laws shall be passed taxing by a
uniform rule, all moneys, credits, investments in bonds, stocks, joint
stock companies, or otherwise; and also, all real and personal property,
according to its true value in money";212 it also struck out the 1868
requirement in Article IX, Section 7, providing: "All taxes levied by
any county, city, town or township shall be uniform and ad valorem
upon all property in the same, except property exempted by this Constitution." 213 In their stead was put the following provision :214 "The
power of taxation shall be exercised in a just and equitable manner, and
shall never be surrendered, suspended, or contracted away. Taxes on
property shall be uniform as to each class of property taxed. Taxes
shall be levied only for public purposes, and every act levying a tax
shall state the object to which it is to be applied."
Does this amendment extend the power of exemption under the guise
of classification? This question has not been squarely presented to the
court, but opposing dicta foreshadow another clash. In Warrenton v.
Warren County, Chief Justice Stacy says :215 "When two sections of the
Constitution are to be harmonized, which shall be favored, the one
which provides for uniformity of taxation or the one which grants
immunity? The basic idea of the Constitution is equality. It eschews
discrimination. Taxation is the rule; exemption the exception, with
the strict construction applicable to the latter." In answer Justice Seawell says :216 "It is a rule of construction applied to statutes where taxes
208N. C. PUB. LAWS 1939, c. 310, §§600(1), 601(1).
200 N. C. PUB. LAws 1939, c. 310, §600(9).
210
211

N. C. PUB. LAWS 1939, c. 310, §601 (10).
N. C. PUB. LAWs 1939, c. 310, §600(10).

212-N.

C. CoxsT. (1930), art. V, §3.

N. C. CoxsT. (1930), art. IX, §7.
2 N. C. CONST. (1936), art. V, §3.
-" 215 N. C. 342, 347, 2 S. E. (2d) 463, 466 (1939).
2
Id. at 366, 2 S. E. (2d) at 468 (1939).
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have been imposed and exceptions made. But here no note is taken of
the fact that the 1936 amendment to the Constitution swept out of that
document any requirement that property be taxed at all, by removing
that feature from Article V and repealing Article VII, section 9, altogether. There is, therefore no 'general rule' or law left remaining in
the Constitution to which the inhibition of Article V, section 5, cl. 1,
against taxing the property of municipalities could form an exception."
It is perhaps worth while to recall in this connection that the relatively
few items of property taxed in the beginning of the state's activities
gradually increased to the point that the constitution makers of 1868
took no violent jump in formulating the constitutional policy of taxing
all property unless the constitution required or permitted its exemption.
For long stretches of our early history, therefore, when governmental
activities were few and governmental units were far between, it might
be said that taxation was the exception, and exemption the rule; but
the consecutive experience of the last three quarters of a century gives
weight to the doubt that the 1936 amendments were intended to encroach on the constitutional policy making exemptions the exception
and taxation the rule. This distinction may lose much of its difference
through legislative classification of particular types of property at rates
so low that the substance of exemption is achieved.
Since the present exemption provisions were written into the constitution in 1868 the number of city, county and state, and federal agencies
in North Carolina has tremendously increased with a corresponding
increase in the amount of property exempt from taxes under the limitations of even the strictest interpretation of the public purpose doctrine. Add to these multiplying governmental units the multiplying
governmental activities of recent years and it is easy to understand the
alarm which colors, if it does not create, the legislative and judicial
declarations of the public purpose limitation. Since 1868, the number
of educational, scientific, charitable and religious "purposes" and the
number of organizations dedicated in whole or in part to these purposes
have multiplied in corresponding proportions, and the great volume of
property owned and used by them for constitutionally approved purposes is growing with geometrical progression. Add to these multiplying charitable organizations the multiplying charitable activities of recent
years, and it is easy to understand the alarm which colors, if it does not
create, the penetrating scrutiny the court is now turning on legislation
extending the protecting shelter of tax exemption first to the property
owned and used by them for charitable purposes, then to property rented
out of them for business purposes when the income is applied to charitable purposes, and then to property when the income is applied to pay
the principal and interest on the indebtedness of the property in the hope
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that after the debts are paid the income may be applied to charitable
purposes.
Shall property belonging to governmental units be favored over
property belonging to charitable organizations by exempting the property
of the one when it is held for any purpose and of the other when it is
held for charitable purposes only? Shall the property belonging to and
used by governmental units and for public and charitable purposes similarly be favored over property belonging to and u~ed by business and
commercial organizations for business and commercial purposes? Shall
a constantly diminishing proportion of property bear a constantly increasing proportion of the tax'load? And is this shifting of rates in any
way counterbalanced by the tendency to shift the tax load from property
to other things? What of the argument of private property owners
that they ought not to be called upon to pay taxes to support governmental units and charitable organizations competing with them for business in the market place? And the argument that when this competition undermines the private business and cuts down its tax paying
power, the state is killing the goose that lays the golden egg? Is it
answered by the argument that after all, governments and charities are
co-operative enterprises which lift from the backs of private property
owners burdens that they would have to pay more heavily to carry by
themselves? Or by the argument that these co-operative enterprises
usually enter the picture after private enterprises fail to meet a need which
should be met and sometimes to rescue private enterprises from ruin
when golden eggs turn to leaden balls? Can the problem be solved by
taking the sum total of all enterprises at any given point in time and
space, allocating certain functions to public enterprise and certain others
to private enterprise, and not allowing either to compete with the other?
If so, what guiding principle -shall put each in its place? And after it
goes to, will it stay put? The battle of exemptions is not a battle of
theories; it occupies one segment in the battle lines drawn by contending forces which are shifting the foundations and superstructures of our
social and economic order. It is a: condition as well as a theory that
confronts us. It is not enough to point out the one or to invoke the
other; each must be re-examined in the light of the other. In these
cases, this re-examination is just beginning.

